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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Postmodern Man in Search of a Soul:   
 
Towards a (Re)Formulation of the Sociology of Religion. (August 2003) 
 
Clasina Buffelen Segura, B.A., Louisiana State University;  M.S., Texas A&M University   
 
Chair of Advisor Committee:  Dr. Stjepan G. Mestrovic 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to evaluate and reformulate the sociology of religion through an 
integration of the work of Carl G. Jung and others.  The purpose of such a reformulation is to 
develop a “new” theoretical framework within which to describe and explain individual and 
collective level religious and spiritual experience in our contemporary postmodern social 
landscape. 
Current theoretical frameworks for the sociology of religion have failed to provide an 
adequate lens through which to view religious experience and have failed to provide an 
understanding of the differences between religion and spirituality.  The modernist framework 
which reduces religious and spiritual phenomena to mere numbers lacks the depth necessary to 
view such a multifaceted and varied grouping of social experience.  The postmodern alternative, as 
well, has multiple problems in terms of application particularly if one accepts the postmodern 
argument that there is no truth.  Following a postmodernist trajectory where there is no truth, one 
must question whether or not the sociological study of religion is relevant at all.  
Presented here is an integrative model which challenges Kantian assumptions about the 
nature of religion.  The relationship between the concepts of religion and spirituality has long 
baffled the social sciences.  Here spirituality is characterized, in a truly Jungian manner, as an 
 iv
archetypal drive shared by all of humanity.  Religion, on the other hand, is best thought of as 
individual and collective representations of an often unconscious search for a soul.    This sort of 
conceptualization proves fuller than those currently offered.   A discussion of religious and 
spiritual options associated with our contemporary American landscape provides evidence of the 
applicability of the framework presented here.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
SOCIAL AND SPIRITUAL TRENDS AT THE DAWN OF A NEW 
MILLENNIUM:  AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 As humanity careened uncontrollably towards the year 2000 and beyond, we 
have found ourselves grappling not only with a general fin de siecle crisis (Turner 1992) 
but also the resulting focus on apocalyptic fears.  Everywhere we look, we can easily 
find evidence of this widespread “crisis of our age“ (Sorokin 1941) in terms of a general 
air of suspicion, mistrust, discontentment, and disenchantment.  And perhaps nowhere 
has this sense of mistrust and disenchantment been more apparent than in our general 
loss of confidence and trust in science and the technological advancements it has 
produced.  Hence, while the views of the Unabomber have been to a large extent glossed 
over by the media and the legal systems as the delusions of a paranoid schizophrenic, 
there are large numbers of mainstream and mentally healthy individuals in the general 
public who while not assuming the lifestyle and murderous extremes of Ted Kazinski 
believe much the same, that technology and the evils it creates are pathological and 
contrary to the very essence of man. 
 Similarly, everywhere we look there exists widespread mistrust of the general 
validity and ability of the hard sciences to provide truth and to produce what it has so 
long promised our enlightened society.  As evidence of this we need only point to the 
fact that the medical sciences continue to produce very contradictory scientific evidence  
__________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Social Psychology Quarterly. 
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on not only the effects and merits of the consumption of alcohol, but also the correct 
 types and amount of fat that should be included in a “healthy diet.”  Furthermore, the 
mainstream medical establishment so closely aligned with positivistic methodology, has 
reason to be mistrusted recently in that their great medical in the area of weight loss 
(Phen Fen and Redux) and plastic surgery (silicone breast implants) have been found to 
have unintended and sometimes deadly consequences. 
Furthermore, the increase in the popularity and use of alternative medicine is 
largely, I would argue, the inevitable result of what has become a rather widespread 
mistrust of the mainstream medical establishment.   In seeking out safer alternative 
therapies, significant segments of our contemporary postmodern public have turned to 
homeopathic and herbal remedies, acupuncture and other eastern based medical 
therapies, and even spiritual mediation and prayer therapy as primary sources of 
treatment.   In fact, the scientific establishment itself has been forced to research and 
acknowledge the benefits and validity of such “unscientific, ancient, and irrationally” 
based approaches to treatment because of the extent to which the disenchantment with 
science in general has taken hold.  
But the air of general mistrust of our enlightenment-based institutions is not 
confined solely to the sciences.  In fact, this sense of mistrust is increasingly prevalent in 
terms of a general suspicion of our modern governmental institution and elected leaders.  
And while popular culture pokes fun at the paranoid individual who, like the character 
“Dale” on the FOX cartoon King of The Hill, firmly believes that the government, far 
from being the protector of democracy and individual liberty it claims, is simply an 
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elaborate conspiratorial and controlling agent which operates covertly to control every 
aspect of our social and biological life.  And while such portrayals are humorous, the 
reality remains that much of the American public holds similar, if not so extreme, beliefs 
about the nature of our government.  The popularity of and serious academic discussions 
about such movies as Conspiracy Theory and JFK further indicate the widespread nature 
of this sort of mistrust.  Similarly, one cannot ignore that opinion surveys reveal that 
even in the face of our new “War on Terrorism,” a large percentage of the American 
population continue to believe that the government acted covertly, and with ulterior 
motives at Waco, Ruby Ridge, and even during the Persian Gulf War.  And the fact that 
the recent documents and testimony support the above indicates that this sort of 
widespread suspicion and mistrust is not without merit.  The fact that there are a number 
of differing accounts or explanations on these incidents and the general public’s refusal 
to accept what is presented as the truth fits well into Giddens conceptualization of trust 
in contemporary societies where so variety of optional explanations leads the individual 
to believe, or trust, in none (Giddens 1984 and 1991). 
The above mentioned trends should provide ample evidence that the postmodern 
social tone, in line with the definition of postmodernism as a rebellion against all things 
“modern” (Rosenau 1992) is true not only in academic circles but also throughout 
society in general where distrust, disillusionment, and disenchantment with modernity, 
its associated power structure, and the culture and civilization it produces are the norm.  
So if there is a tendency towards an abandonment of the rational modernist 
establishment, to what are we turning instead?  Even the most cursory survey of our new 
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born millennium and the recent fin de siecle social landscape reveals an enthusiastic 
embracing of the irrationally which modernity cast aside as not only archaic but 
unnecessary.  As such, we are seeking tremendous levels of renewed interest in things 
like the “scientifically unexplainable,” mysticism, and spirituality. 
In fact, everywhere we look in popular culture there are indications and examples 
of our love affair with the irrational.  While there has been a long history of science 
fiction in western society, the unprecedented popularity recently of TV shows like The 
X-Files and Touched by an Angel have increased dramatically making such themes the 
norm rather than the quirky expectation.  Even the news media, which once stuck to the 
hard objective and explainable facts, now finds it necessary to regularly address and 
report on “miracles of faith” if programs are to attract and keep their audience base.   
Further, the trailers or previews of coming attractions at the movie theaters also 
indicate the selling power of the irrational and unexplainable.  The formula for success at 
the box office now not only includes expensive special effects and live action, but also 
irrational and unscientific motifs including evil spirits that transport themselves through 
touch (1997’s movie Fallen), pre-pubescent children learning to cultivate the powers of 
witchcraft they have been blessed with, and postmodern mythology focusing on a higher 
power or force which permeates the entirety of the universe (The Star Wars Franchise).  
In fact, the very popularity and belief in such themes serves as a direct affront to the 
modernist worldview that places major emphasis on humans as not only the supreme 
being, or animal, but also as the rational and sole master of the universe.  
 5
Having discussed above some of the more general trends in the social mood of 
the postmodern age, I would now like to turn the attention of this introductory section to 
a more focused discussion of the changes in the spiritual and religious landscape.  This 
sort of discussion is particularly  important as I see the changes in the spiritual mood of 
our age as going hand and hand with the more general trends mentioned above.  Hence, I 
would argue that to even begin to ponder the above without looking at the changes in 
religious participation as well as the spiritual outlook or philosophy of the population 
one cannot paint a complete picture of the crisis associated with our postmodern age. 
Hence, in the final part of this section, I will present brief examinations of 
changes in the religious landscape in terms of church membership and participation and 
then provide a very short discussion of the spiritual tone in general.  Any review of 
social organization literature is sure to include religion as one of one of the most 
important factors in the successful functioning of society in general.  It should come as 
no surprise that there is some level of suspicion of religion in general.  Furthermore, it is 
important to acknowledge that unlike the social institution we know as the state or 
government, Americans have, and continue to abandon religious institutions without fear 
of punitive retribution from the larger system.  Or rather, it might be argued as an 
alternative explanation that these individuals are best viewed as religious shoppers, 
shopping for religions and churches that suit their needs best. 
Recent social trends provide evidence of a significant pull away from, or an 
abandonment of the major established and (rationally) organized Protestant religions in 
favor of the more loosely organized non-denominational churches and congregations 
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that are appearing on the social landscape with increasing frequency.   This trend has 
been extended to the hyper reality of cyberspace as internet churches, ministries, and 
spiritual groups continue to appear the greatest of speed and attract a huge following.  
And the very differences in the organizations of such churches in comparison to that of 
the more mainstream religious groups are quite striking.  The independent nature and 
lack of connection to a larger and ruling hierarchy appears to offer its postmodern 
membership not only a sense of autonomy but a higher level of importance within the 
group’s structure.  Furthermore, the fact that the actual religious services do not appear 
to be bound by strict organizational law or established religious doctrine may attract the 
postmodern American individual who often appears to be perpetually in search of 
something new (Baudrillard 1988). 
Likewise, and perhaps because of a keen personal interest in architecture, it is 
also important to point out that there appears to be a new trend associated with the 
physical buildings which house religious institutions and houses of worship.   There are 
significant changes in that the buildings which house such groups appear no longer to be 
bound in the least by the centuries old expectation of what a religious place of worship 
should look like.  Long gone are the large and often grand cathedrals once so closely 
associated with religious life.  Increasingly the religious landscape is now dotted with 
functional buildings that even some members refer to as “barns of workshop.”  And the 
appearance of churches in converted hardware stores and strip malls suggest a huge 
departure from the lofty images associated with churches of the past.  And increasingly a 
number of religious organizations have no house of worship at all but rather work out of 
 7
secular locations including school auditoriums and arenas.  The recent development of a 
phenomenon called non-denominational Christian “cowboy church” held in rodeo arenas 
and livestock barns perhaps represents the extreme of this trend.   
Finally, it would appear that religious involvement, might at least for the 
American majority, be a transient phenomena in that studies suggest that an increasing 
segment of college students report decreasing involvement in “church“ while still 
professing strong spiritual beliefs.  On the other hand, spirituality in general appears to 
have rebounded with a vengeance.  The media constantly bombards us with factoids 
indicating that Americans increasingly believe in God and miracles, and view 
themselves, if not as significantly religious individuals, then as highly spiritual.  
Furthermore, this rise in spirituality has coincided with a growing interest in a number of 
Easter faiths and world views which often focus more on individual spirituality than 
organized group religiosity.  And in fact the increased use of herbal and oriental medical 
remedies may be partially the result of this interest. 
This general separation of religiosity and spirituality, in this writer’s opinion, 
perhaps better than any of the social trends and tones outlined here best personifies the 
air of disenchantment associated with our postmodern fin de siecle anti-enlightenment 
spirit.  As such, the work presented here and in my dissertation will look at the inability 
of the modernist sociological framework’s theories of religion to explain the true nature 
of religion and spirituality in the postmodern age.  Further, I will argue that the 
mainstream social sciences have in fact never really provided an adequate framework for 
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the study of religion as Parsonian sociology has failed to adequately and correctly 
conceptualize the major components at the very heart of religion in general. 
In the sections that follow I will begin to outline a re-assessment of the 
sociological approach to the study of religion used by the mainstream establishment and 
point out what I see as the inherent flaws in this overall framework.  I will then provide 
what I hope will serve as the building blocks of a new framework which incorporates the 
misinterpreted and misused work of Durkheim as well as that of Swiss psychologist Carl 
G. Jung.  And in an attempt to illustrate its applicability to the contemporary American 
landscape, I will briefly discuss several “postmodern religions” within the context of the 
works discussed here.  In the end, I hope to provide the means by which to present a 
clearer and more correct picture of the religious and spiritual landscape associated with 
what appears at first glance to be a highly fragmented American reality in which, to 
paraphrase Jung, postmodern man searches for a soul. 
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CHAPTER II 
ARRIVING AT OUT CONTEMPORARY REALITY: 
FROM TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS TO A POSTMODERN ABUNDANCE OF 
RELIGIOUS CHOICES 
 
  
General Evolutionary Trends And The Development Of Religion 
 
Before beginning any discussion of religion in contemporary America it is first 
necessary to look at how we have arrived at our current social milieu where religion is 
often seen as being at odds with both modern and postmodern worldviews.  Social 
evolution can be traced through three general time periods, the traditional or romantic 
era, the modern era, and now the postmodern era.  By looking at religion within the 
framework of the movement from community to society, as discussed in Ferdinand 
Tonnies’ now classic work Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft ([1898] 1957), we can get a 
clearer picture of how we have come to arrive at the point we are now.  And as Tonnies 
wrote this now classic work more than a century ago, long before the beginning of the 
postmodern age, a third category must be added to his typology, one that Tonnies 
himself probably did foresee arriving sometime in the future.  I will, as many others 
have, refer to this third additional category or stage, for lack of a better term, and in the 
postmodern spiritual, as post-Gesellschaft society (Lyons 1987). 
The earliest and longest period of human history is what has been termed the 
traditional period. This stage of evolution can be viewed as analogous to Gemeinschaft 
or community.  Tonnies extolled the virtues of Gemeinschaft which was characterized 
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by a sort of mother-child bond (or social relationships which were characteristically 
maternal in nature), spontaneous feelings, and a basic sense of unity among individuals 
and groups despite existing differences.  During this traditional period, individuals had a 
rural sort of mindset and were generally members of a single all encompassing 
community based almost exclusively on kinship ties.  Again, membership was confined 
to a single group where all members worked to perform basically the same tasks 
necessary for the maintenance of the larger community.  The sense of self during this 
stage was therefore well defined and singularly in nature as the individual was a member 
of a single social group, community or society.   
The movement into the modern period, or into Gesellschaft or society, has been 
traced to several factors including population growth, new technologies, and 
industrialization.  According to Tonnies, Gesellschaft was characterized by the rational 
or contractual relationship between individuals.  Unlike the maternal relationships 
Tonnies viewed as characteristic of Gemeinschaft, the social relationships found in 
Gesellschaft were more paternal, or legal rational, in nature.  During the modern era, 
more and more aspects of social life moved outside the kinship network as the division 
of labor increases (Durkheim [1893] 1965).  As a result, the individual worked outside 
of the home and was therefore a member of a professional association in additional to 
his/her own kinship group.  As the level of the division of labor increased further, similar 
social organizations associated with other aspects of one’s life outside the family unit 
including religion and education began to emerge.  It is during this period that the 
fragmentation of self began to occur as individuals increasingly identify with more than 
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one social group.  Unlike the traditional or romantic period where all social interactions 
occurred in immediate proximity, the technological and industrial advances of the early 
modern period make other forms of communication possible the advent of a mail service 
system and the printing press make possible written or nonverbal communications 
increasingly devoid of physical, or face to face, contact. 
Much of the western world has now entered into what can best be termed the 
post-gesellschaft period.  An important clarification must be made concerning the choice 
of the term post gesellschaft.  In the post-gesellschaft period, elements of community co-
exist with heightened societal development.  Perhaps the prime example is that even as 
we claim to have become increasingly metropolitan or global individuals, we are at the 
same time currently seeing a strong resurgence in ethnic identity (Waters 1990). 
Primary among the reasons for the shift into the post-gesellschaft period are the 
remarkable technological advances that have taken place in the last few decades.  These 
scientific and technological advances have changed society, and social life, dramatically.  
Whereas gemeinschaft and gesellschaft were identifiable by their rural and urban 
mindset respectively, the rural-urban distinction is now largely a thing of the past.  Even 
the most geographically isolated and formally rural areas have been saturated by the 
larger technological culture of fun and violence. In post-gesellschaft America, the rural 
landscape, once dotted with quaint farms and charming local downtown areas, is now 
filled with satellite dishes and Wal-Mart Super-Centers that offer the rural dweller 
everything from dry cleaning to manicures and franchised fast food.  Thus in the present 
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post-gesellschaft period, technology allows for the existence of and maintenance of mass 
society and the culture of fun that goes along with it.     
The extreme technological advances associated with this third post-gesellschaft 
period have also made it possible for individuals to extend their social networks to a 
point unimaginable a century ago.  Advances in communications and transportation 
technologies, especially those related to the telephone and information technologies, 
have allowed for the development of numerous specialized social networks or 
(sub)communities.  And because these postmodern subcommunities or voluntary 
associations have become so specialized in focus, the postmodern individual, in order to 
meet his or her social needs, or more appropriately desires, finds him/herself involved in 
a growing number of such networks or organizations leaving little time to devote fully to 
any one social organization. 
 
The Place Of Religion: A Historical Summary 
Religion, like all other social phenomena and the organizations and institutions 
based on them have changed dramatically as society has evolved.  Religion, in its more 
traditional or less developed form was all encompassing and functioned not only to give 
the individual meaning and knowledge of things s/he could not explain or understanding 
(including birth, death, and the larger universe) but at the same time served to  maintain 
and reinforce community by helping define individual and group identity.  As might be 
expected, many of the beliefs and social experiences of rites and rituals were based on 
the will or heart and were emotional and irrational rather than rational in nature.  
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Durkheim’s research on traditional religions such as the Arunta Tribe ([1915] 1965) 
illustrates well several characteristics important to the nature of traditional religion.  
First, the set of beliefs described in Durkheim’s study of the Arunta illustrated not only 
the highly irrational and emotional face of traditional religions but also that the totality 
of both one’s social and physical existence were experienced within this all 
encompassing setting.  Similarly, studies of early religions indicate the individual and 
group identity is, in fact, one and the same.  The lack of differentiation between and 
among individuals goes hand and had with a minimal division of labor characteristic of 
traditional societies in which the religion exists.  And because of the all encompassing 
nature of primitive religions made necessary by minimally developed social systems, all 
aspects of society, including the normative guidelines were made clear and stringently 
(re)enforced through religious practices and through the strict compliance to spiritual 
and religious beliefs.  
Developments in technology set off a vast number of social changes which mark 
the movement from the traditional period, characterized by gemeinschaft or community, 
to the modern period characterized by gesellschaft, or society.  The division of labor 
made possible and in fact necessary, by technological advances resulted in the 
development of the first distinct social institutions.  The technological advancements in 
tools and agriculture in general and the increase in population size and density it brought 
signaled the need for a division of labor at the group or societal level.   These larger 
societies then required social institutions which preformed special functions necessary 
for the survival of the members of the larger society.  Among the first of these social 
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institutions to develop were religion and education. This division of labor lead to an 
increasingly more prosperous population where individuals, focusing on more 
individualized tasks, made greater strides in a number of areas including technology and 
science.  The development of the printing press and a generally more educated 
population lead to changes in the social philosophy of individuals and the stated goals of 
the larger society. 
It is during this second era or modernity that we see the development of a more 
enlightened population whose beliefs and worldviews began to take the form of that is 
associated with the enlightenment movement.  Increasingly, the modern, educated 
individual believed that human nature, while containing irrational aspects also involved 
the capacity for rational individual and societal actions. The enlightenment, which 
emerged first in France, argued, in direct opposition to the view of human nature during 
the preceding  period, that he individual was inherently rational and could be guided by 
rational decision making process to make decisions simultaneously beneficial to the 
individual and society.   
Given the above changes, the face of religion was altered as well.  The irrational 
nature of primitive religions had to be altered to fit a new worldview where the 
individual was master of his/her own rational fate and responsible for the objective 
betterment of the larger society in which s/he lived.  Similarly, technological 
developments greatly reduced the extent of the unknown changing the centrality of 
religion and religious/spiritual experience.  As it was no longer necessary for religion to 
 15
explain the world and was often seen as prohibiting social change, the role of religion 
appeared to be in jeopardy. 
The exact moment at which western society moved into the third stage of social 
evolution is as hotly debated as how exactly one should define the current social 
landscape in which we live.  There are however two basic arguments about the exact 
nature of the relationship between the postmodern era and that which it followed.  The 
first argues that the postmodern era, and the social phenomena and culture it creates 
constitutes an extension of the modernist project while the second argues that 
postmodernism represents an all out rebellion against eeverything modernity held and 
holds dear (Rosenau 1992 and Harvey 1989).  Those who argue that contemporary 
western culture and the larger postmodern landscape constitute and extension of 
modernity as a somewhat expected outcome of increased rationalization see all problems 
associated with this state of high modernity as largely acceptable if unforeseen side 
effects (Giddens 1984 and 1991).  The fragmentation of society and the individual as 
well as a widespread fear of uncertainty are seen as acceptable risks when balanced 
against the benefits associated with life in an enlightened society. This conceptualization 
of the postmodern condition is not all that novel.  Max Weber’s concept of the iron cage 
certainly mirrors this sentiment (Weber 1976b) in that Weber predicted the problems of 
increasing levels of rationality.  Weber offers no way out and in fact, seemed somewhat 
unconcerned with these negative consequences of a modern enlightenment based 
society. 
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Science and technology have made truth, in the postmodern era, transient at best.  
And as a result, all social narratives and explanations, including religious ones, are 
questionable at best.  With so many differing expert interpretations of truth now given 
equal status, religious doctrines and religious institutions at the societal level have lost 
both status and societal relevance.  As a result, organized religions become less 
structured and fragmented and individuals find little truth and meaning in membership 
and participation in traditionally defined religions and seek similar experience 
elsewhere. 
 
Form And Function: 
Religion In Modern And Postmodern Society 
 
I believe I have made clear the all encompassing forma and function of religion 
in traditional social communities.  I will now turn to the task of outlining the nature of 
the form and function of religion with regards to both modern and postmodern societies 
calling upon the work of all three of sociologies founding fathers in the process.  
The modernists, who have claimed Durkheim as their own, see religion as a 
social intuition charged with, or given the function of, maintaining social order, defining 
and teaching morality, and maintaining social identity as the individual and group level. 
As societies more further towards the modern potion of the evolutionary continuum, the 
irrational components of religious communities and beliefs become less important and 
the rational nature of a more paternalistic institution (rational and devoid of nurturing) 
takes center stage.  
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And while religion still provides explanation, it provides increasingly less 
emotional attachment and is typified by doctrines which, while geared often at the 
individual, or grounded and societal concerns.  As the portion of human existence seen 
as mysterious or unexplainable decreases during modern times, irrationally based 
religions become increasingly less necessary.  Unlike Durkheim’s positive assessment of 
the form and function of religion, Max Weber’s judgment is decidedly mixed.  Weber, in 
typical modernist form, views those religions which hold individual well-being over that 
of the larger society, Catholicism and a variety of Eastern and Oriental faiths for 
example, as decidedly pathological to the larger society.  Those religious doctrines and 
systems of beliefs, even when resulting in individual benefits, results in the benefit to the 
larger society and social progress, are viewed as decidedly positive.  One need only skim 
the pages of The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1976) to glean 
Weber’s beliefs that the Protestant faith provided the necessary condition for the rise of 
capitalism and by extension the development of an increasingly rational, and thus ore 
enlightened social system.  On the other hand, those religions that equate personal 
suffering and sacrifice with salvation, were seen by Weber in a completely different light 
as they served  to inhibit much needed social change. 
Karl Marx too saw religion in a negative light.  But for Marx, religions on any 
sort prohibited the individual from understanding his/her true plight in life by attributing 
suffering on earth to rewards in an afterlife.  By extension, a belief in the benefit of 
individual personal suffering had extreme effects on the larger group and society.  That 
is, unlike Weber who saw Protestant religions as necessary for the movement into his 
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capitalist utopia, Marx saw religion, in any form, as a major obstacle to an equally 
rational socialist society where all individuals endure an identical and equitable “plight 
of life.”  The problem here is that while a Marxist utopia would be devoid of religion in 
a  more classical traditional sense, the resulting social or civil system which was to 
replace it itself would take on many of the same characteristics of religion as defined by 
Durkheim (Rosenau 1992).  
If one accepts the major philosophical assumptions which underlie the modernist 
enlightenment project, then religion in terms of both its form and unction is at least in 
pat contrary to modernity’s stated goals.  As western society moves into the latest 
postmodern period of social evolution, the position of religion in the larger social 
structure is increasingly tenuous.  Religion has and continues to be a presence in 
advanced postmodern society despite the predictions associated with the modernist 
project.  If modernity had achieved its goals, then traditional religions should have long 
ago been made obsolete in a world where science and technology function to eliminate 
human suffering and explain nearly all of the once unexplainable.  Our current social 
reality indicates that these lofty goals have not been met.  Religion persists today taking 
both traditional and modern forms which have adapted to the more advanced social 
landscape in which it exists. 
To be sure, religion in our contemporary postmodern era has evolved a great deal 
from the all encompassing religions associated with gemeinschaft as well as from the 
more rationally based religions associated with gesellschaft where religion served the 
larger society in maintaining group identity, morality, and social order.  In postmodern 
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times membership in and participation in religious groups and organizations increasingly 
offers an alternative to rationality and the irrational side effects, associated with 
advanced societies.  Religion and the irrationality associated with it exist simultaneously 
with other very rational aspects of social life.  Our contemporary American social reality 
suggests that it is possible for the irrational and rational to exist together in harmony.  
And the fact that participation in religious and spiritual pursuits has increased as 
confidence and trust in science and technology are increasingly questioned indicates 
that, in line with the anti-enlightenment view of human nature, the irrational side of 
humanity can not be completely suppressed or controlled. 
So what does the nature of religion in modern and postmodern life tell us about 
the relevancy of religion?  How has religion changed in response to changes in the 
philosophy and worldview of more developed societies?  And what does the nature of 
religion in modern and postmodern life tell us about the relevancy of religion in general?   
If the modernist project had been completely correct in its philosophical 
assessment of human nature and the future of society, one would expect that religion in a 
more traditional sense would have long since become extinct or at least transformed into 
an all but unrecognizable rational justification of the larger societal structure.  To be 
sure, religion has changed dramatically.  But the changes do not signify an end in the 
relevance of religion or its importance on a larger social stage.  Indeed, religion as been 
effected by and transformed during modernity and postmodernity but it has not been 
rendered irrelevant by them.  Indeed the changes in religious institutions and religious 
and spiritual experience at the individual and group level continue not only to be 
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necessary for the survival of individual religious organizations but also for the survival 
of society as well.   As such, despite the attempts by other major social institutions to 
take over the functions of religion, survival of human societies would seem tied to the 
very existence of religion, whose form may change, but ultimately provides integrative 
and reinforcing functions.  For this reason, religion will likely always remain relevant in 
society, regardless of its level of development. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE STATE OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION TODAY 
 
 
The Founding Fathers And Classical Theories Of Religion 
 
It will be my argument throughout the remainder of this work that while 
Durkheim been badly misinterpreted and bastardized by the positivistic Parsonian 
establishment which I argue has becoming increasingly irrelevant and incapable of 
providing an adequate framework for the study of our contemporary religious and 
spiritual landscape, a re-reading of Durkheim’s work free of a Parsonian lens offers 
sociology the foundations of a new sociology of religion.   As such, it is necessary to 
begin by pointing out the limitations of the more mainstream theories of religion 
currently being employed in the sociological literature. 
To be sure, all three of the founding fathers of sociology addressed the topic of 
religion and its place in society.  While Weber’s work had the most widespread and 
lasting influence, the work of Durkheim offers a rich theoretical framework that has 
been, I would argue, in the shadow of Weber’s popularity.  So rather than begin with a 
lengthy discussion of what aspects of Durkheim’s thought have been (Mis)appropriated 
into modern theories of religion, a subject that will be discussed in more length in this 
and the chapters that follow, I will begin this section by briefly describing the basic, and 
often opposing views of Marx and Weber on the topic of religion and spirituality.  
Marx, through much of his work, argued that religion consisted of 
institutionalized means of, through its associated belief system and worldview, has 
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severe negative impact on its members and more generally society.  According to the 
Marxist approach, religion functions as a means of repression in that it serves to keep its 
members from seeing the true oppression of their existence and similarly “prevented” 
and inhibited action and social change which would alter and improve social existence at 
both the individual and societal level.  Hence, in essence, Marx views religion as an 
inherently negative social institution which if society is to better itself must be 
eliminated. 
Max Weber on the other hand, saw Western Protestant religions at least in a very 
positive light.  Most simply put, Weber saw religion as an essential social institution 
which transmitted the worldview, or work ethic, that makes economic and social 
betterment through the vehicle of capitalism, possible.  And while Marx makes no value 
judgments which assign negative status to any one religion, Weber is ethnocentric in that 
he sees Protestantism, and in particular Calvinism, as superior and systematically and 
summarily dismisses not only Catholicism and Judaism but all Eastern religions judging 
them as socially inferior in that they fail to nurture, or more appropriately inhibit, the 
development of capitalism. 
The extent to which the religious background from which each came is 
interesting in that it appears to have had a large effect on the manner in which each 
viewed religion in general and in the place each saw it taking in the larger theoretical 
perspective of each.  And while biographical sketches almost always include mention of 
their religious background, little is made of the place of it in their theoretical work and is 
mentioned almost always in passing.  Any examination of the three founding fathers’ 
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theory of religion that did not address this issue would be only partially complete as I 
believe that this particular aspect of their biographical history is central to the 
understanding of the sociology of religion in general.   
The Protestant more specifically a Calvinist background appears to be woven 
deeply within the work of Marx, the Protestant, or more specifically, the Calvinist 
background of Max Weber, combined with the pull of a highly bureaucratic father, had 
tremendously influenced the work of Max Weber.    Try has he might the work of the 
father of value free sociology was effected greatly by the religious environment in which 
he developed socially.  The manner in which he views his own protestant religion in 
relation to the very negative assessment he has of non-protestants, non western, cultures 
indicates perhaps and inability to separate himself from this influence and brings into 
question the potential for anyone to be value free.  And given the high level of tension he 
most certainly felt between the views of his mother’s liberal Protestantism and the more 
godless bureaucratic world in which his father and later he himself worked may have 
resulted in what, I would argue, might be viewed as an attempt to straddle the fence, or 
his rejection of all religion with the exception of his own.  
The Iron Cage also flows, I would argue, from what might have been viewed by 
Weber as the irreconcilable conflict between of his mothers focus on liberal 
Protestantism and his fathers often contradictory focus on the political bureaucracy in 
which he grew up and developed.  As such, the conceptualization of the iron cage can be 
viewed in terms of a representation of the unfixable internal conflict Weber felt between 
a bureaucracy which limits the meaning and function of the individual and community 
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level religious life.  That is, one may hold a group of religious beliefs and wish to 
exercise them, or put them to use, but the bureaucracy, and its insistence on a rational 
framework (rationally defined and maintained structure and function at all levels of 
social life) and the cultural of bureaucracy in which they exist, or are imprisoned in 
limits the extent to which one can integrate these beliefs and practices in everyday life.  
It is apparent, I would argue from Weber’s biographical information that he was torn 
between the two, or pulled in both directions equally and may have been frustrated with 
an inability to escape these (Weber 1976a).  It might then be argued that Weber, and by 
extension society in general, were forced to live in an Iron Cage where rationality 
limited them.  The fact that he offered no way out is important.  The fact that Weber 
offers no way out might be interpreted in to ways; first as a theoretical manifestation of 
the extent to which he was so torn between his parents and by extension religion and 
bureaucratic society they held so dear but also the constant pull and interplay between 
society and religion in general.   
The religious background of Durkheim and its effect on his work is arguably the 
most interesting of the three.  Durkheim is similar to Marx in that they share in a 
common Jewish background which both later rejected.  They differ in that while Marx’s 
initial rejection occurs sometime in early childhood and resulted, after confirmation into 
the Lutheran faith as a young adult, in a rejection of religion in its entirety, Durkheim 
appears to have been brought up in the faith, by a rabbi father and while he rejected 
Judaism as a young adult retained a belief and interest in religion in general (Mestrovic 
1988). 
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Throughout the whole of Durkheim’s large body of work run themes that are 
suggestive of his Jewish heritage.  The importance placed on balance at both the 
individual and societal level is most certainly suggestive of a Jewish mind.  So too is his 
focus on the importance of social integration associated with religious membership and 
religious experience at both the individual and group level. While many social scientists 
of his time dismissed eastern religions as unworthy of study, Durkheim spent a 
tremendous amount of time in examining what had been ignored and dismissed by Marx 
and Weber alike.  
Mysticism, associated with some forms of Judaism, clearly finds its way into 
Durkheim’s assessment of religion in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 
([1915] 1965).  Durkheim is clearly intrigued by the mystical religious rituals associated 
with primitive tribes the Arunta and seeks them as essential to reinforcing individual and 
group identity and argues that such experiences are as essential for the maintenance of 
even the most modern of societies.   
Durkheim’s respect for religion finds it ways into most aspects of Durkheim’s 
large body of work.  And the fact that these themes repeat themselves in nearly all of 
Durkheim’s work, and are applied to all aspects of the social from education to suicide 
indicate the extent to which this sort of Jewish mindset, regardless of his religious 
affiliation and practice, indicate that religious background cannot be ignored in the case 
of Durkheim and thus should be included in any work which seeks to examine his work 
(Mestrovic 1988).  The fact that it is ignored and if fact the very Jewish name David is 
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removed from his name suggests an attempt by the mainstream to ignore this very 
important facet of Durkheim’s writings. 
The background of Talcott Parsons, is important as well as it is through his 
translations and interpretations that most American sociologists have come to  know and 
understand the works of the three classic social scientists discussed above.  Could 
Parson’s own religion background have had some effect on his reading of the classics 
and in turn directed in a very real sense the larger American sociological mainstream 
that followed?  The answer, I would argue, is a resounding yes.  Parsons’ biography 
indicates that he was brought up in the Congregational Church was the son of a strict 
minister (Ritzer 1988).  The consequence of his strict protestant upbringing can be found 
in his translations of all of the classical social theorists but most clearly in his reading 
and interpretation of Durkheim which are now accepted without question by mainstream 
academia.  His imposition of a highly rational sense of order and morality, which would 
typify the sort of upbringing and religious exposure he experienced early on, find their 
way into his translations of Durkheim’s larger body of work and has transformed the 
French and Jewish influenced original work of Durkheim into what is now viewed as the 
watershed event for positivistic sociology which stresses social order and strict 
organization.   
My own reading of Durkheim, now labeled the father of functionalism because 
of the hyper rational Parsonian translations and interpretations, on the contrary indicates 
that he was concerned more with the function of society rather than with any rational 
form it might take.  The interpretation of the term organic as applied to modern society 
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was seen by Parsons as an attempt at making seeing modern society as analogous to an 
organic body with the various social institutions serving as organs working together for 
the maintenance of the whole.  In doing so, the fluidity of the social stressed by 
Durkheim is lost in the reliance on a positivistic Parsonian interpretation which places 
weight on the division of labor and an organic analogy that was never of primary 
importance to Durkheim.  Lost also has become the intended meaning of the term 
anomie, which Parson’s translated, in a strict protestant fashion, as a state of 
normlessness and not as the state of sin or unbalance indicated in Durkheim’s original 
work (Mestrovic 1988).   
As such, not only has the work of the three social scientists viewed as the 
founding fathers been effected by the religious context in which they existed but they 
have potentially been further influenced in a sense by the religious background of the 
individuals who present their work to us in their translation into English. The above 
illustrates the role of religion in the initial formulation and writing of these and other 
classic works as well as the intermediate influence of third parties like Parsons effects 
greatly the theories in which we work.  And despite Weber’s insistence that value free 
sociology was not only possible but necessary if we are to achieve a truly scientific 
discipline, Weber’s own work and that of the others discussed here indicate that even 
though most others provide evidence not only that it may in fact be nearly impossible to 
achieve but that despite the influence of subjective factors, such frameworks can in fact 
stand the test of time. 
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Contemporary Modernist Functionalist Framework 
And most basically put, the functionalist approach views religion almost strictly 
in terms of an organization in the larger social system that work or function to gather 
with the other  “essential organs” to maintain the larger organism of society.  And for the 
functionalist, the major function of religion is the maintenance of the social order 
(Caporale and Grumelli 1971).  Hence, religion is seen as an institution of integration 
that serves to reinforce religious morality which in turn reinforces social control in that it 
serves to enhance and foster civic morality as well. 
And as the focus remains at the institutional level, the actual worship, rites, and 
rituals are relegated simply to discussions of the mechanisms by which membership is 
maintained and strengthened and thus the social order reinforced.  Hence, the 
mainstream approach sees rituals and rites as products of religion rather than as a system 
of symbolic manifestations of underlying religious and spiritual belief.  Examined 
through an anti-enlightenment lens, it should, and will later in this paper become 
apparent that this sort of viewpoint is flawed in that while the modernist approach may 
acknowledge some degree of irrationality as being associated with many modern 
religious rites and rituals, it sees the irrationality as simply a necessary means to 
achieving rational ends (the maintenance of social order) and fails to correctly 
conceptualize (post)modern religion as an evolved and rationalized system of customs 
and rituals which are manifestations or representations of an “irrational” set of spiritual 
beliefs and principles. 
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Furthermore, the focus of contemporary mainstream sociological theories of 
religion has been largely restrictive in that the classification scheme is limited largely to 
Catholicism, Judaism, and Protestantism.  The inherent flaw in this typology should be 
obvious.  Religious diversity is nothing new to be sure.  A variety of Orthodox Christian 
faiths have been present for centuries and the rise of Islam dates back even further.   As 
such, one must question if this three category typology ever worked and how it is to 
work now in the face of a social landscape rich with differentiation and religious and 
spiritual faiths that defy such “simple” categorization.   And a simple survey of 
Americans today which would certainly elicit a wide variety of very varied religions and 
spiritual associations as responses and thus revealing the enormous shortcomings of this 
approach.  In response to the rise in the numbers of people falling outside” the three 
standard categories, the positivistic establishment has responded with the addition of a 
fourth catch all category labeled “other.”  This too leads to problems in that there is a 
lumping together of a growing number of vastly different “religions” a this single 
category, an perhaps worse yet a summary dismissal of a large number of religious and 
spiritual endeavors all together as viewed they often fail to conform to the functionalist 
ideal type, are often ignored as unworthy of study.  Hence there appears not only to be 
an inability of the mainstream functionalist framework to adequately address the “other” 
but also a general unwillingness to acknowledge social phenomena that fall outside of 
the enlightenment based narratives.  Another such flaw can be located in the fact that the 
modernist definition of religion includes or requires the presence of, or a belief, in a 
deity in the more conventional sense.  Furthermore, there is a general assumption that 
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any such deity be masculine in nature.  In fact, this is not a new bias and may in fact 
account for the general view in the relevant literature that religion functions almost 
exclusively in a paternal manner and ignores those feminine aspects which are crucial to 
many religions including Catholicism and Judaism.   Furthermore, this definitional 
aspect results in the exclusion of not only deity-less eastern religions including 
Buddhism and Taoism but also denies the fact that religion can and has spread outside of 
the “supernatural” realm and into things like worship of nationality or civil religion, and 
in social causes including environmentalism and feminism.   
By far, however, the most glaring flaw I see in the current modernist approach to 
religion is the inability to understand and make clear the distinction between spirituality 
and religion.  If the modernist social sciences acknowledge spirituality at all, it is in 
equating spirituality with religion and with the world view or the larger system of beliefs 
created by the institution itself and which serves the purpose of legitimizing and 
reinforcing a “need” for involvement in church and an adherence to the related religious 
and societal principles.  Despite this long standing conceptualization of the connection 
between religion and spirituality, a large body of quantitative data exist which would 
suggest that this sort of conceptualization is flawed.  If one accepts that religion and 
spirituality are innately tied to one another one would expect to see a positive correlation 
between church membership or attendance and levels of spirituality.  The reality remains 
that spirituality measured in terms of attitudinal assessments scales do not provide 
evidence of such.  Instead, those who score the highest on the spirituality scales are very 
frequently those who report no church affiliation and do not attend religious services on 
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any regular basis (Roof and Perkins 1975).  Results such as this indicate a problem both 
with the way spirituality and religion are conceptualized and the relationship that has 
long been assumed to exist between the two (Lawson, Swyers and McCougllough 1998).  
The following sections will illustrate that there is indeed a significant distinction 
between the two.  And while the two are often largely intertwined, our postmodern 
reality and the trends discussed in the above section reveal that they must be considered 
separately as well.  And in sum, the current limitations and flaws associated with the 
sociology of religion represent major thorns in the side of a discipline whose 
“laboratory” is an increasingly cosmopolitan landscape where such exclusionary 
definitions are largely inappropriate. 
 
 
Postmodernism:  Does It Constitute A Viable Alternative? 
In order to adequately address the extent to which postmodern social theory 
offers an adequate alternative framework within with to address religion and spiritual 
phenomena, it is necessary to discuss the development of postmodernism as an academic 
school of thought and its relation to the modernist movement which has, up until now, 
provided the majority of sociological literature on the subject of religion and spirituality.  
It is easy to conceptualize modernity as the rational child of the enlightenment era, an 
age where individuals were to have shed their barbaric skins, and through reason, 
entered into a civil society, devoid of the need for religion in a more classic sense.  
Defining postmodernism has becomes at best difficult and is usually done so 
subjectively, in a very postmodernist style by the individual utilizing the term and has 
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lead to a prominent sense of fragmentation in the larger body of postmodern literature 
(Roseanu 1992).  However, as postmodernism has moved from the humanities and the 
arts into the social sciences, there have been more unified attempts at establishing a 
“mainstream” theory of postmodernism (Rosenau 1992, Mestrovic 1992, and Kellner 
1989). 
  Central to the postmodern debate is the concept of subjectivity.  Taken to the 
extreme one must question the relevance of postmodern thought to this area as religious 
and spiritual experience increasingly is viewed as an individual experience.  It this is the 
case, one must ask exactly what is the point of such a postmodern debate at all if 
everything is subjective anyway?  Is there really a point to such a discussion if it is 
rendered mute before it even begins?   
Postmodernism makes the assertion that all new meaning, in the de-centered 
world is not discovered, but rather located within a specific context or community at the 
subjective level.  Avoiding the mainstream mode of knowledge associated with 
modernity, the postmodernist focuses on life at the margins of contemporary society for 
his/her understanding of the social making this sort of approach intriguing.  
The larger postmodern movement is so fractured that any discussion of it must 
address the distinction that exists between the two competing strains within the larger 
movement; skeptical (or pessimistic) and affirmative (or optimistic) postmodernism.  
This distinction is based on their general outlook on the problems associated with the 
postmodern age, how they believe these problems are best studied, and finally, the 
potential solutions to these problems.  It is also important to point out that these two 
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categories are probably best viewed as extremes on a larger continuum (Rosenau 1992).  
That is, most postmodern theorists fall somewhere between the two and includes aspects 
of both strains in their larger theoretical perspective.   
The skeptical, or pessimistic, camp, (Jean Baudrillard for example), remain 
highly influenced by the work of Heidegger and Nietzsche, and argue that the world is 
fragmented, disjointed, caught up in a sea of meaningless without boundaries.  These 
descriptions are based on three major assumptions; the demise of the subject, the death 
of the author, and the impossibility of truth.  For this camp, the postmodern individual 
finds him/herself in a social world that is grim, cruel, alienating, hopeless, and 
ambiguous.  The future consists of coping with the excesses of modernity which have 
led to problems of overpopulation, genocide, and images of an upcoming apocalypse. 
In line with this outlook, the skeptical postmodernist argues that there is no truth, 
in any form.  All that exists is a play of semeiotics, which is utilized by individuals to 
play language games in a debate over symbolic meaning.  Skeptics question the value of 
the enlightened individual, or subject, who is unified and coherent, and argues that to 
believe that the individual subject serves as an adequate references point for social 
discourse (Baudrillard 1988) is to believe in fairytales.  The subject remains a fiction, 
and can only be constituted by the recognition of the many roles one plays and masks 
one wears.  The skeptics vehemently object to all notions of the subject, or subjectivity, 
which they argue are rational projects of the Enlightenment.  Like the object, the subject 
is seen as a pragmatic symbol of modernity and has lead to the modern myth of a unified 
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individual subject.  Finally social reality becomes for the skeptic and to some degree the 
affirmative as well, simply a simulation with little or no universal truth beneath it. 
The other end of the continuum is occupied by the affirmative postmodernist 
who agrees with the skeptic’s critique of modernity but offers a more optimistic view of 
the possibilities involved with the advent of the postmodern age.  The beginnings of the 
affirmative standpoint can be located in the pragmatic tradition including John Dewey 
(West 1989).  This strain of postmodern/ism is geared towards the understanding of 
meanings produced through an interactive process at the subjective level.  Unlike the 
skeptic, the affirmative continues to hold on to the idea that some meanings, values, and 
truth are in fact superior to others. 
The affirmative camp has proposed a reconstructed notion of the postmodern 
individual, not as an individual rational actor, but rather as an individual who possesses a 
somewhat reliable form of knowledge based on life experience. Under this revised form 
of subjectivity, the focus is not only on the agency of the subject, but on the individual’s 
unique experience. Thus, subjective experience becomes the point for social analysis.  
For the affirmative postmodernist, the main level of analysis focuses on daily life at the 
margins of society and on pathologically marginal individuals rather than on mainstream 
society and well integrated members.  This approach continues to reject objective frames 
of relevance, but offers optimism concerning what can be obtained as a result of a 
critical pragmatic approach (Denzin 1992). 
Like the skeptics, the affirmatives also reconstruct the notion of truth.  And while 
rejecting universal truth, they do accept the possibility of specific, contextual, personal, 
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and community based forms of (subjective) truth.  And the affirmative argues that truth 
consists in an individual subjective form and that, in essence, this subjective truth is 
equitable with valid forms of social knowledge, particularly social theory.  Thus theory, 
for the affirmative postmodernist, becomes a narrative of daily life and lived experience.  
In sum, the affirmative restores the end of object-subject debate ignored and 
marginalized by modernity. 
The myriad of social conditions associated with contemporary social life come 
together in a world where many of the major assumptions of postmodern theory are held 
as truth.  That is, today’s society has increasingly become fragmented and commitment 
phobic.  Given this extreme sense of fragmentation inability to commit and paranoid 
suspicion it becomes easier to accept and believe not only in the end of truth but the 
elevation of the individual subject to a place of primacy.  Our contemporary social 
reality has been altered to the point where the individual familiar with the modernist 
framework must question if religion, along with all truth and history has died or been 
transformed so radically that its form and function are no longer discernable on the 
social canvas of contemporary American life.   
Is there then a point to applying the postmodernist framework to the sociological 
study of religion?    To be certain, the current religious and spiritual American landscape 
appears to fit well into postmodernism’s larger descriptive definition of the postmodern 
condition.    That is, the religious and spiritual landscape we now find ourselves in is 
dotted with what might best be termed religions that can certainly be characterized as 
hyper realities, religions whose churches defy the space time continue and are 
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characterized by a lack of face to face interaction, by increasing fragmentation, and a 
lack of significant commitment.  In this sense, postmodernism works well in that it 
provides us with a rich descriptive template making such phenomena easily 
recognizable.   
When examined more completely, one is forced to consider that while 
Postmodernism does prove to be an excellent descriptive tool in that it outlines basic 
themes associated with out current, or contemporary reality but what it fails terribly at 
doing is in providing an adequate, or for that matter a correct means or framework for 
explaining or analyzing the reality behind, or beneath, contemporary religious and 
spiritual phenomena.  And taken to its extreme one must question whether the 
sociological study of religion or anything for that matter is a worthwhile pursuit at all.  
Because in denying not only the relevance of truth, but its existence at all makes mute 
any such discussions.   
Given the importance of the place of religion and spiritually in the individual, 
group, and societal context societies and time and its apparent refusal to, in postmodern 
terms die, I cannot accept the extreme alternative offered by postmodernist theory.  
Because while modernist theory tends to reduce the function of religion almost 
exclusively to an agent of social control, postmodernism sees it as irrelevant all together 
and thus does not offer an acceptable alternative.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RELIGION (RE)DEFINED: THE MISUNDERSTOOD WORK OF 
DURKHEIM AND THE IGNORED WORK OF C. G. JUNG 
 
Introduction 
In the above section I attempted to outline some of the crucial problems 
associated with mainstream approaches to religion.  It is the opinion of this writer that 
these approaches have rendered themselves problematic in terms of their application to 
the postmodern information age.  In this chapter, I will examine more closely the work 
of David Emile Durkheim and Carl G. Jung in an effort to provide a clearer and more 
appropriate definitional framework.  This “alternative framework” is not only an 
improved approach to religion and spirituality in light of the multitude of diverse forms 
associated with the postmodern age but also the more traditional forms addressed, 
inadequately and incorrectly, by the Parsonian mainstream. 
And as the title of this chapter suggests, this portion of the paper focuses largely 
on correcting the widespread misunderstanding in sociological circles of Durkheim’s 
work on this subject.  Further, and in keeping with my anti-enlightenment call for the 
breaking of disciplinary boundaries, I will examine the work of Carl Jung whose 
writings, while considered “psychological” and even mystic in nature, mirrors very 
closely that of Durkheim not only in terms of the characteristics and functions each sees 
associated with religion but also in terms of shared basic assumptions about the nature of 
man and society.  And in correcting such misunderstandings, I hope to lay the 
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foundations for the sections that follow in terms of providing a basis for the integration 
and extension of the work of these two eminent anti-enlightenment thinkers into a 
simultaneously new and old theory of postmodern religion and spirituality with 
particular application to our contemporary postmodern American landscape. 
The period of time spanning from the end of the nineteenth through the first part 
of the twentieth century was ripe with the development of important theories within the 
social sciences (including sociology, philosophy, psychology, and anthropology).  
During this time, discussions of religion and spirituality were not uncommon.  The large 
bodies of work produced by David E. Durkheim, a philosopher by education specializing 
in sociology, and Carl G. Jung, a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry, provide 
evidence of the shared importance of religion to a number of different disciplines and 
social theorists a century ago.  And the fact that these theorists are rarely addressed 
together continues to amaze this scholar in particular.  Amazing also is the fact that 
while the shared approach outlined in this work is now, relatively speaking, 
chronologically ancient, remains exceptionally suitable for examination of the 
contemporary religious and spiritual landscape.  The works of Jung and Durkheim 
present the contemporary social theorist interested in examining aspects of human 
culture associated with religion with a comprehensive body of work which covers not 
only theory at both the micro and macro level, but also, and very importantly, an 
anthropology laced methodology by which examination and analysis can take place.  
That is, the hybrid approach presented in the work of Jung and Durkheim covers both 
individual (psychological) and societal (sociological) level phenomena, in this case 
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religion and spirituality, using an anthropological methodology which examines such 
phenomena across different groups, communities, and society and in the same unit 
across various historical periods. 
Despite a number of glaring similarities between the works of these two theorists, 
there is almost a complete lack of formal connections or links between the two.  Such 
connections are, at best, difficult locate.  While Jung, who comes chronologically after 
Durkheim, does not acknowledge any Durkheimian  influence, they did have mutual 
contacts primarily in the form of Durkheim’s student Lucien Levy-Bruhl and indirect 
connections in the form of a shared integration of the work of Wundt ([1887] 1916).  It 
is apparent however that even without clear direct citations of Durkheim in Jung’s work, 
the connections and parallels are striking.  Throughout this chapter, I will point out the 
nature of the similarities in the context of the contemporary religious and spiritual 
landscape. 
My focus is on Jung and Durkheim, not only because they are of prime 
importance to me in general but because the ties that bind their work together are so very 
strong.  David Emile Durkheim was chosen for several reasons including the fact that 
while much of his work has been redefined and framed so as to fit neatly the standard 
positivistic and Parsonian mold, a different contextual reading of Durkheim’s larger 
body of work, should reveal that the powerful anti-enlightenment influence lies at the 
basis of his impressively inclusive body of theoretical and applied works almost always 
tie directly or indirectly to his concern with religion.  And while squarely outside of the 
sociological mainstream, the psychological work of the Swiss analytical psychiatrist 
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Jung contains endless parallels with Durkheim’s sociological work.  The use or 
integration of a non-sociologist into a sociological framework within which to study 
religion is important because I feel strongly that mainstream sociology has limited itself 
greatly by placing barriers to the inclusion of works from other disciplines.  As such, I 
find that this sort of approach allows for an increasingly more well rounded description, 
examination, description and analysis of a variety of complex social phenomena. 
 
Shared Philosophical Foundations: 
On The Influence Of Schopenhauer And The German Romantics  
 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the anti-enlightenment 
approach shared by Jung and Durkheim, or any theoretical framework for that matter, it 
is first necessary to examine the philosophical assumptions which lie its heart and 
include assumptions about not only the nature of knowledge and truth but also that of 
man, and by extension the social systems, or societies, created and maintained, at least in 
part, through human interaction.  It is only through this sort of examination that one can 
truly grasp, and grapple will, the numerous and often complex theories associated with 
the social sciences. 
And while this work focuses on an argument that the currently accepted 
enlightenment based narratives and thus the associated philosophical assumptions about 
the nature of man and knowledge on which they are based are not only flawed but 
wholly unsuitable for the study of our postmodern religious and spiritual landscape, it is 
nonetheless necessary to briefly mention, for the sake of contrast, these basic 
enlightenment assumptions.  Most simply put, the positivistic theories currently used by 
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mainstream sociology are deeply influenced by the French enlightenment philosophical 
tradition which views the individual (or social actor) and all social phenomena (at both 
the individual and societal level) as being created entirely through the actions of and 
interactions between essentially rational beings.  And as such, all things social, including 
social institutions all cultural products, both material and nonmaterial, are viewed most 
often as equally rational manifestations. 
And while vast and essential differences between the enlightenment and anti-
enlightenment exist, it is first important to acknowledge that to a large extent, these two 
opposing traditions tend also to be compartmentalized or separated geographically as 
well.  While the enlightenment is seen as being centered in France and personified by the 
works of Descartes, the anti-enlightenment tradition is most closely associated with 
Germany and is best personified by the works of Schopenhauer and the larger German 
Romantic Movement. 
While the relevance and importance of the geographical home of the anti-
enlightenment tradition may seem to many to be largely irrelevant, I would argue that 
the historical and cultural context of its German home is of the utmost importance to the 
declining significance of this approach to the social sciences in general and to the study 
of religion in particular.  That is while Germany stood for centuries as the cultural and 
intellectual center of the western universe, the 20th century and Germany’s role in the 
two world wars severely impacted its prominence as a nation as well as the place of the 
intellectual works of its people.  So severe was the impact of these world events that the 
dark legacy continues to cloud the importance of the classical German works discussed 
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in this paper.  With the fall of the importance of the Germany on the intellectual stage, 
France stepped in and captured the philosophical place of prestige lost by Germany.  As 
such, the enlightenment tradition, associated closely with the more rational French has 
now taken a firm hold of the social sciences.  
I would presume, based on the above, that this is at least in part to blame for the 
downplaying of the anti-enlightenment tradition as being at the heart of Durkheim’s 
work and a mainstream interpretation of Durkheim’s work as rational and purely 
enlightenment based.  The reality remains however that Durkheim was extremely 
influenced by the works of the German Romantics including Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche which are cited throughout his large body of works (Magee 1983, Ellenberger 
1970, and Mann 1939).  Nor can the positivistic establishment deny that Durkheim spent 
several years studying in Germany, which was, at the time, the only place to study the 
social science and what would later be called sociology. 
While the positivist mainstream has been quite successful in covering up the 
“germaneness” in Durkheimian sociology, Jung’s German influence has been much 
harder to ignore.  Not only are there literally endless references to Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche and Goethe throughout all twenty plus volumes of his collected works, but 
Jung lived and worked during the height of the period of what might be termed German 
revulsion.  In fact, Anthony Stevens, an imminent Jungian scholar (1993), argues that an 
unfounded association between Jung and the intellectual basis of Nazism and 
germaneness in general stands as a major reason for the continued widespread dismissal 
of his work not only as a mystical but as dangerous. 
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The following two sections will involve somewhat more detailed discussion s of 
the major tenants of the German Romantics found in the work of Authur Schopenhauer 
([1818]1966) as they manifest themselves in the work of Jung and Durkheim.  I would 
like to briefly end this section on the philosophical influence with a short overview of 
these important philosophical premises in a purer sense.  And as with all such works, the 
philosophical works of Schopenhauer and those who followed in his path are defined 
and molded by the very definition of human nature and thus society and the possibility 
of human knowledge of the truths of not only ourselves (or our selves) but also the 
physical and social environment which we occupy. 
As was alluded to earlier, Schopenhauer’s conceptualization of man stands in 
almost complete opposition to the enlightenment conceptualization of man which puts 
primacy on the irrational aspects of human nature.  That is, while Descartes and the 
larger modernist project, view the mind, or rationality, as the superior components of the 
mind body distinction, Schopenhauer and the whole anti-enlightenment tradition view 
the will/heart, or the irrational components of human nature as innately more powerful 
than the mind or human capacity for  rationality.  And having said this, it would be 
apparent that Schopenhauer’s conceptualization of the will is probably the single most 
important aspect of his work in that it serves as a unifying concept of not only for his 
own philosophical approach but for the larger German Romantic tradition as well. 
Most basically put, for Schopenhauer the will, or what is sometimes referred to 
as the heart, is the essence of man.  So important is the irrational proportion of human 
nature that Schopenhauer described it in terms of essential roots that provide the basic 
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nutrients needed for the survival of both the individual and society.  The components or 
contents of the will are vast.  Among its irrational contents are the basic instincts 
associated with all animals as well as the various emotions and innate human capacity 
for good (love and compassion) and bad (evil and barbarism). 
For Schopenhauer and the larger German Romantic Movement, the will is 
viewed as a unifying characteristic common to all humanity.  As such, the will is often 
referred to in terms of a common or shared force which not only guides individual and 
group level experiences but also the production of social products or representations.  
Schopenhauer viewed the irrational contents of the will as providing basic templates or 
forms which through interaction and human social experience manifested themselves in 
terms of a system of representations which we know as society or the social world.  And 
it is this very tenet that lies at the heart of his landmark work The World as Will and 
Representations ([1818] 1966).  It is also crucial to note that Schopenhauer argues that 
(advanced) humanity is largely blind not only to the existence of such an archetypal 
reservoir but also to its irrepressible nature.  And in this vein, one might best describe 
the will in terms of a storehouse of powerful unconscious guiding human forces shared 
by all humanity. 
So what then can be said about truth and knowledge in light of the fact that 
Schopenhauer viewed the essence of man, or the irrational will, as largely unconscious 
in nature?  One might think that like Kant ([1781] 1958), Schopenhauer would have 
argued that the reality behind the external social world is unknowable.  But this is not the 
case.  For Schopenhauer there is indeed truth or reality behind social representations. 
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And while complete knowledge of the contents of the will, or the most basic human 
truths, is likely unattainable, we can grasp partial glimpses of such irrational based truth 
not through the rational objective methods proposed by the enlightenment, but through 
subjective experiential examination of ourselves and our larger social world. 
 
 
Unifying Themes Of Society And The Individual: 
The Collective (Un)Conscious And The Irrepressible Human Will 
 
Having provided, in the previous section, a brief overview of the major premise 
of Schopenhauer’s German Romantic approach to the nature of man and society, I would 
now like to turn to a more detailed discussion of how these assumptions manifest 
themselves and are developed in the work of Durkheim and Jung.  As the title of this 
section indicates, I and others see the major unifying concept in the work of both the 
social scientists addressed here as being the conceptualization of the will in terms of the 
collective conscious or collective unconscious.  As such, this section arises from what I 
see as a need to elaborate on the fact that because of the anti-enlightenment approach 
taken by both Durkheim and Jung, which sees an inescapable connection between the 
individual and society in that the same templates, forms, or what Jung referred to as 
archetypes contained within the will manifest themselves similarly at both the individual 
and societal level, their larger theoretical frameworks allow for a more effective and 
simultaneously analysis of both individual experience and societal level social 
phenomena including such things as religion and spirituality. 
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The adoption of the German Romantic view of human nature as largely irrational 
is quite apparent in the work of Durkheim.  This is especially apparent in his 
conceptualization of human nature as being made up of two poles, the heart and mind.  
Like Schopenhauer, Durkheim views the heart, the seat of man’s irrationality, as the 
stronger of the two poles. Jung’s work too rests on the assumption that the irrational and 
primordial aspects of human nature defy rational attempts at repression and that in the 
end such attempts are fated to result in both individual psychic conflict and large-scale 
social pathology. 
Similarly, Durkheim and Jung are in agreement with Schopenhauer concerning 
the innate nature of the will and its contents.  There are endless references in the work of 
both to the guiding power of forces instincts, forms, cosmic factors, and archetypes and 
the power they exercise over the course of our social and psychological lives.  And it is 
this shared or common storehouse of the will’s forms that Durkheim refers to as the 
collective conscious and Jung, because of the fact that we are often unaware of these 
instincts and their powers, later referred to as the collective unconscious. 
And the fact that the two, despite almost identical conceptualizations or 
definitions of the will and its role in human existence, attach slightly different labels is, 
to this writer at least, somewhat significant and hence begs attention.  To be sure, both 
see the individual and humanity as largely unaware of the nature of the will or the 
collective (un)conscious and its functioning in everyday life.  But both also acknowledge 
that we can become at least particularly aware, or conscious, of its contents and 
functioning through what might best be termed subjective experiential examination of 
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our own lives and general social trends.  Hence I will throughout this paper and others 
argue for the use of the term collective (un)conscious in an effort to construct a more 
complete integrative conceptualization. 
So then, as the title of this section suggests, the collective (un)conscious and its 
operation in our individual and collective existence and experience provides in the work 
of Jung and Durkheim a basic theoretical framework which not only unifies the 
individual and his/her larger society and world, but also provides an adequate framework 
which is appropriate not only across societies but also across time as well.  And having 
made a statement which, in light of the power of the modernist establishment, borders on 
heresy, I must acknowledge and attempt to answer the modernist question of how 
exactly this is possible.  Most simply put, Jung and Durkheim both make the argument, 
providing empirical evidence as support, that while the collective (un)conscious contains 
constant components, its manifestations or concrete representations are in fact modified 
across time and culture to fit the social and even physical environment in which they are 
produced. 
This is what Durkheim set out to illustrate in The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life ([1915] 1965).  In this and other works, Durkheim argued that the same 
“elementary forms” lie at the basis of most religious systems regardless of time and 
culture.  More modern versions can therefore best be viewed simply as modified or 
evolved representational systems of the same basic beliefs and represent the same 
components of the collective (un)conscious or shared human will.  And Durkheim 
argues from the very beginning of this work, that while the study of elementary, or less 
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developed or evolved forms simply allows for easier and less clouded examination of the 
archetypal forms and that the same methodology applied to more modern or developed 
forms would reveal that many of the same tenets, templates, or basic forms lie at the 
basis of all religions.  And in fact, even the most cursory examination of Jung’s work on 
Catholicism (1958) which would appear at first glace to be vastly different eastern faiths 
is sure to reveal this to be true.   
In fact, much of Jung’s work seeks to provide evidence of the existence of the 
collective (un)conscious and its individual and cultural manifestation across time and 
cultures.  On the individual level Jung, like his teacher Freud, dealt extensively with 
dreams.  Based on an extensive compilation of individual dreams Jung found similar 
basic forms not only across individuals from not only different societies and cultures but 
also across vastly different historical periods (find citation).  Similarly, Jung’s 
examination of accounts of flying objects in literature, personal accounts, mythology, 
and artistic representations shows the same basic forms lying at the basis regardless of 
time and culture (1959).  Hence, while the shape and form of the cultural objects change 
over time and more specifically in this case as science and technology develop, the crux 
of the accounts and experience remain the same thus providing support and 
legitimization for such a theoretical framework. 
Hence I will end this section by stating that in sum, the crux of the shared 
Jungian and Durkheimian approach stands in direct opposition to the modernist approach 
in that because of its conceptualization of the collective (un)conscious or the will as an 
irrepressible and building force, it views the enlightenment idea of completely rational 
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human action as delusional in the sense that it denies the superior irrational will common 
to all humanity.  
 
Breaking The Micro-Macro Boundary 
It is my argument that while the mainstream modernist perspective has been hard 
pressed to provide explanation for religion and spirituality at a single level of analysis, 
the anti-enlightenment approach of Jung and Durkheim provides sociology with the 
potential to explain such social phenomena at not only the macro or societal and global 
level but also at the micro or individual level as well.  The reality that sociology is a 
fractionalized discipline with well defined and specific areas of interest including social 
psychology, social organization, community, and political sociology stands much less 
provide a comprehensive theoretical framework stands as evidence of an inability of 
much of contemporary sociology to break through the macro-micro boundary.  I hope to 
provide the initial evidence that the infusion of a more anti-enlightenment based 
approach to the social sciences provides the means by which such boundaries can be 
broken. 
Even a quick review of the work of Durkheim, Jung and their fellow anti-
enlightenment theorists including Simmel and Veblen should reveal that those 
approaching sociology from anti-enlightenment tradition almost literally write the same 
work over and over again.  That is, they apply the same anti-enlightenment framework to 
what would appear through the modernist lens to be vastly different social phenomena 
(Mestrovic 1992).  And the fact that identical theoretical frameworks are used by both 
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Durkheim and Jung to explain a variety of social phenomena or facts including suicide, 
mental illness, religion and spirituality, and even education stands as testimony to the 
ability of such an anti-enlightenment based approach to break our now well established 
modernist boundaries. 
An interdisciplinary approach of sorts is called for in terms of how we are to 
achieve what would appear to many to be simply a lofty goal.  We need simply look to 
Durkheim and Jung who broke such boundaries as the previous fin de siecle in terms of 
the finding the means by which such well established boundaries can be broken today.  I 
would argue that it is essential that we take the lead of Durkheim and Jung and go 
beyond or outside the boundaries of our own disciplines and embrace, use, and integrate 
the work of psychology, philosophy, and anthropology.  Using the anti or counter 
enlightenment approach discussed in this work, it should become apparent, and not 
totally revolting to the modernist establishment, that not only has the macro level been 
built by micro level representations and interactions but similarly that micro level 
phenomena are at least partially determined by the macro level social, cultural, and even 
physical environment in which they occur. 
In ending this section I would like to point to what I see as the best example of 
such boundary breaking, Durkheim’s Suicide ([1897] 1966).  In this work, Durkheim 
examines simultaneously the individual and collective level phenomena in illustrating 
how the individual’s experience(s) in the social world (or the macro domain) effect and 
produce individual or micro level phenomena.  In sum, Durkheim provides here one of 
the best examples and illustrations of how the cultural and societal context and 
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individual circumstances interact to produce the micro level social fact or phenomena we 
know as suicide.   
 
Towards A New Scientific Approach 
As I pointed out, not only have the theoretical  grand narratives associated with 
the modernist approach to the sociological study of religion proven to be largely 
irrelevant to our postmodern social reality but also that science in general is now viewed 
as suspect by the general public.  It is in the anti-enlightenment work of Jung and 
Durkheim that I see the potential grounds on which to reconstruct a new and radically 
different scientific approach.  
And the modernist establishment is sure to ask what is scientific about an 
approach that denies not only the existence of objective truth but also that truth and 
knowledge of the social world can be reached solely through the use of the pure rational 
and objective methodology so closely associated with the modernist mainstream.  And 
again I would answer that the work of the anti-enlightenment thinkers illustrates that the 
search for truth need not be positivistic and wholly rational in nature.  And to get directly 
to the heart of the matter, while Jung and Durkheim both conceive of their analysis and 
theoretical work as scientific, it should be apparent based on what has been presented in 
this paper that the very nature of their definitions of science, knowledge, reality, and 
social facts are vastly different than those associated with the mainstream modernist 
establishment. 
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Like their academic father Schopenhauer, both Durkheim and Jung believed that 
there is in fact an objective reality beneath social phenomena manifested through 
representation at both the individual and collective level.  And while their approaches 
see humans as unable to completely understand this reality because of its (un)conscious 
nature and origin, some degree of knowledge is in fact knowable. And in opposition to 
the positivistic establishment Durkheim is falsely credited with establishing, his anti-
enlightenment methodology incorporates not only a certain degree of rational and 
systematic examination but also and more importantly a large dose of subjectivity in the 
form of intuitive experience.  Hence for Durkheim and Jung alike, the “scientific” 
methods by which we are able to examine, experience, and understand not only our 
larger social world but also ourselves involves contributions from both poles of human 
nature, or should involve the mind and the will, or rational and irrational methods.  And 
as both Durkheim and Jung see the social landscape in terms of Schopenhauer’s “world 
as will and representation” or a product of the combination of rational and irrational 
elements, the only hope they see for true knowledge lies in a methodology which 
incorporates both. 
It is in the above discussion of the conceptualization of knowledge, truth, and our 
human capacity to understand, the only hope they see for true knowledge lies in a 
methodology which incorporates both.  It is in the above discussion of the 
conceptualization of knowledge, truth, and our human capacity to understand and 
experience truth that I see the foundations for a new and simultaneously old 
methodological approach to understanding religion and our larger social world.  And 
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while I myself grapple, based on the larger modernist baggage, a quick survey of the 
work of Durkheim and Jung, which includes works entitled The Rules of Sociological 
Methods (Durkheim [1938] 1964) and Essays on a Science of Mythology (Jung and 
Kerenyi 1949) suggest that the modernist monopoly on the term and definition are 
unfounded and thus must be viewed in a more even handed manner allowing for the 
integration of a more subjective approach which the work of both epitomize. 
 
Durkheim And Jung On The Basis Of Religion  
And before I can move into a discussion of the major characteristics of religion 
which are important to the anti-enlightenment perspective, I feel it necessary to lead off 
with a brief discussion of Durkheim and Jung’s definition and conceptualization of 
religion.  Too be sure, and as I have pointed out in several other works, there are endless 
similarities between the work of Jung and Durkheim.  No where is this more evident 
than in their common conceptualizations of religion.  And the fact that Jung, who wrote 
decades after Durkheim and in relatively close geographic and philosophical proximity 
to his work, makes no reference in his text to Durkheim makes the enormity of these 
connections all the more interesting. 
The fact that Durkheim and Jung share in common a similar definition of religion 
is not surprising in that both were greatly affected by the works of the German Romantic 
Movement which emphasizes the will, its store house, the collective (un)conscious  and 
the manner in which it manifest itself in terms of collective representations.  The 
following two passages from Durkheim’s Suicide ([1897] 1966) and The Elementary 
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forms of the Religious Life ([1915] 1965) illustrate extremely well how Durkheim 
defines religion: 
“Religion is, in a word, the system of symbols and means of which 
society comes conscious of itself.  It is the characteristic way of thinking 
of collective existence.” (Durkheim [1897] 1966, pg. 312) 
 
“Before all it is a system of ideas with which the individuals represent to 
themselves the society of which they are members and the obscure but 
intimate relations which they have with it.”  ([1915] 1965, pg.  257) 
 
Jung in a very similar fashion to Durkheim, and largely because of their shared 
philosophical foundation, conceptualizes religion as a system of collective 
representations which are best viewed as manifestations of the collective unconscious 
which itself contains the various aspects of the will (or the diverse drives and templates 
he refers to as archetypes).  And for both Durkheim and Jung, religion serves the same 
basic function.  That is religion offers man the means by which to make sense of one’s 
self, his/her relation to and place within the community /society, and also one’s relation 
to the larger world and universe.  And while both see the strengthening of society as 
important in more developed or evolved religious systems, the most crucial function of 
religion, in its purest sense, is not the maintenance of social order as suggested by 
Parsons, but the provision of a system or means by which the individual is able to make 
sense of one’s self and his/her place in the physical, social, and psychic environment 
(see Jung 1933). 
And it is important to begin a discussion of the specific characteristic of religion 
in the work of Durkheim and Jung by first elaborating on just what is meant by the term 
“symbolic.”  For Jung and Durkheim both, the fact that this system of abstract ideas and 
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relationships which lie at the basis of religion are made concrete and powerfully 
“experience-able” allows for its members or the faithful to more easily understand 
“things,” and thus also serves to strengthen faith in general as well as community or 
societal ties.  In an attempt to illustrate the subjective elements and functions of religious 
and spiritual life, Jung provides elaborate and detailed analysis of the masses, rituals, 
and customs associated with the Roman Catholic faith (1942 and 1954).  And this is 
essentially what Durkheim himself, some thirty years earlier illustrated in The 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915) in terms of the aboriginal peoples of 
Australia and their primitive forms of totemism. 
In addition, both Jung and Durkheim pointed to the group effect of such 
irrational and symbolic experience associated with religious traditions.  Durkheim 
refereed to a collective effervescence or heightened excitement which, during religious 
experiences, appears to have a contagious nature in that it spreads throughout the faithful 
participating in such rituals.  Similarly Jung, borrowing from Levy- Bruhl (1979) used 
the term participation mystique in much the same manner.  In fact, for both, it is the very 
sort of subjective and irrational experience that serves to strengthen the community ties 
and is in fact a periodical requirement for the maintenance of religious faith and 
community in general. 
And I hope it has become apparent from the above discussion that religion for 
Durkheim and Jung differs greatly from the modernist framework in that the essence of 
religion is located not in the conscious rational attempt to produce and ensure continued 
social order.  Rather, for these anti-enlightenment social philosophers/theorists, the basis 
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of religion is found in the irrational attempt to make more understandable the irrational 
nature and forces which guide and bind the individual, society, and humanity alike into a 
community.  A further difference of great significance for discussion of the postmodern 
religious and spiritual landscape lies in the fact that neither Jung nor Durkheim finds the 
Presence of a “deity or “god” a necessary aspect of the religion.  Again, and in keeping 
with a definite emphasis on the symbolic nature of religion, gods too are largely 
symbolic in that they represent personifications of religious ideals.  Jung in his 
explorations of western religion explores this very topic and points out that the Christian 
God and Jesus Christ alike are symbolic on two levels.  That is, deities function as both 
God images and God ideas.  As such, not only do they provide a symbolic “face” or 
image with its own specific psychological and often physical characteristics as a point of 
reference for the faithful, but they also epitomize the critical spiritual ideals of the faith 
with which they are associated. 
Unlike the modernist approach discussed in the preceding section that casts 
religion in a masculine light in that it emphasizes a “patriarchal” function of enforcing 
social order, the anti-enlightenment approach shared by both Jung and Durkheim views 
religion in a very feminine light.  Durkheim himself, throughout The Elementary Forms 
of the Religious Life ([1915] 1965) refers to religion as the “womb” which functions to 
nurture and support the individual and society as well as to give birth to individual ideas 
(Mestrovic 1992).  Jung himself views religion as a collective representation of the great 
mother archetype.  Furthermore, Jung and Durkheim both felt that both masculine and 
feminine aspects (capacities or templates) are contained within the collective and 
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personal unconscious of all individuals and that religious experience should involve 
feminine aspects of the individual members or participants. 
And in fact, both discuss at some length the fact that the Christ god Jesus Christ, 
while being physically or anatomically male, was endowed with largely feminine 
characteristics and thus acted as a motherly nurturer to the faithful.  Similarly both 
pointed out that not all religions were equally feminine.  A major tenet which came out 
of Durkheim’s work on Suicide ([1897] 1966) was that the more feminine nurturing and 
supportive aspects of Judaism and Catholicism appear in part to lead to lower suicide 
rates among members then those timed to the more masculine and patriarchal modeled 
Protestant faiths. 
And while contemporary summaries of Durkheim’s empirical examinations are 
confined, to his Western religions, his research and framework are not limited to the 
three categories associated with modernist framework (i.e. Protestantism, Catholicism, 
and Judaism.)  In fact, he addressed not only the aboriginal tribes of Australia but 
various Orthodox faiths, and a multitude of eastern religions and spirituality as well.  
Furthermore, Jung’s fascination with eastern spirituality in general was greatly  
facilitated by increased contact with a (counter)culture which to some degree accepted 
and synthesized into their own worldviews aspects of Eastern religions that are to all that 
foreign to or different from those associated with our more Western forms (Singer 
1972).  The anti-enlightenment, German Romantic definition and conceptualization used 
by both Durkheim and Jung can indeed be applied to the traditional and contemporary 
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Eastern religions thus allowing for the breaking of the western-centric chains which 
currently (and have for centuries) bind the social sciences.     
Having outlined the basic characteristics of religion associated with the work of 
both Jung and Durkheim, I would like to end this section with a brief discussion of the 
problems both saw as associated with religion in the modern age.  And to be sure, and as 
I have said before the work of many of the anti-enlightenment thinkers who wrote at the 
end of the 1800’s were quite prophetic not only in that they “foretold” the future social 
problems which had begun to emerge at the end of the 19th century and continue to 
pervade and plague, to an ever increasing degree, our own society at the beginning of the 
third millennium.  This is particularly the case with the changes they point out on the 
religious and spiritual landscape.  Durkheim himself, more than a century ago, saw the 
loss of religious and spiritual integration and support, and by extension societal 
integration, as a key factor in the trends associated with suicide rates.  Similarly, he 
illustrated trends towards the deification of man and a search for individual centered 
religions in terms of the cult of the individual and the search for individual based 
spirituality.  Furthermore he correctly pointed out that the modern age was characterized 
by the hyperextension of the sacred to things once profane and the worship of such 
things as science and the state.  And true to his anti-enlightenment foundations, 
Durkheim’s outlook for the future was pessimistic in that he saw an almost irreversible 
crisis of modern man and society as giving rise to and being heightened by such 
individual based trends reaching the societal level. 
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Jung himself found similar trends associated with what he called modern man.  
This concept can be extended to postmodern man who would appear incapable of 
believing in anything and is largely unable to invest any significant part of him/herself in 
such endeavors as religion which might take away from his/her sense of individual 
importance.  But, for Jung, man is, by nature, incapable of escaping the innate drive or 
force which compels him and is thus left searching in the postmodern landscape for a 
soul which not only fits his own lifestyle but satisfies the archetypal needs of his/her will 
(Jung 1933 and 1954).  And it is this that is largely the cause of the separation of 
religiosity and spirituality.  Americans and Westerners in general have firmly taken hold, 
and with pathological results, of the idea that one need not be involved with organized 
religion and its now “unnecessary symbolic rituals” in order to be spiritual.  The rise in 
the integration of Eastern spirituality even within organized Western religions too serves 
as evidence of the pervasiveness of this belief and accounts for the real changing in the 
religious landscape. 
 
A Simultaneously Old And New Approach To The Sociology Of Religion 
And Spirituality 
 
I hope to have illustrated adequately in this chapter that the common framework 
presented in the work of both Jung and Durkheim, and typical of the  anti-enlightenment 
approach differs greatly from the mainstream Parsonian version crouched in an 
inescapably and to at least some degree a flawed modernist framework that assumes all 
things social to be largely rational in nature.  And armed with the above discussion, even 
the most brief survey of our contemporary social landscape should reveal to anyone 
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open-minded to the anti-enlightenment perspective that not only is the social world in 
which we exist largely irrational in nature but that the approach of Jung and Durkheim 
has not only weathered the test of time but will continue to be more applicable to the 
postmodern social world. Furthermore, based on the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of 
our contemporary social reality (or perhaps more appropriately, social realities) where 
East meets West boundaries are more easily crossed (though not always with the best 
results and consequences), the current social existence demands the use of a framework 
which is capable of correctly accessing the nature of the social phenomena associated 
with both sides of the cultural divide.  Furthermore, a framework which contains the 
work of Durkheim with that of Jung breaks not only the cultural boundaries but also the 
sociological-psychological disciplinary boundaries in that it offers the power to explain 
not only religious and spiritual experience in both the east and west but also provides 
explanations at both the individual and societal level.  Hence I would argue that in the 
adoption of this sort of framework with modifications for postmodern age we have a 
viable and simultaneously old and new framework which better than nay other current 
option explains postmodern America’s search four a soul and the social landscape in 
which we search for it.   
 
Religion And Spirituality:  Defined And Distinguished 
The above outlines the major aspects of the work of Durkheim and Jung that are 
particularly applicable to our contemporary postmodern social landscape.  The final 
areas that must be addressed concerns how best to address defining and making the 
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distinction between the concepts of spirituality.  Making a distinction between the 
concepts is key to any discussion of the postmodern religious landscape where 
increasingly people have increasingly find experience and emotion outside of the 
confines of church.  The answer to his puzzle, I would argue, has existed for more than a 
century in the misinterpreted work of Durkheim and the ignored work of Jung as well as 
in that of those who followed in their path (primarily anthropologist Joseph Campbell 
and sociologist Pitrim Sorokin).    
The answer is found not in an outright discussion of the two concepts but in the 
context of a common discussion of mythology across different cultures and in terms of 
changes and evolution through different historical periods.  Durkheim, Jung, and 
Campbell all shared an interest in mythology and the term was often almost 
interchangeably with religion and spirituality as mythology can be seen as the religion of 
society put into narrative form which makes the guiding principles more easily grasped.   
The mythological system associated with a given society can be viewed in a very real 
sense as the religion and spirituality told in narrative form.  Just as Durkheim and Jung 
similarities across religions in all cultures and throughout time which indicated that, 
housed within the collective (un)conscious was a template for the creation of religion 
and all cultural systems and that these templates can be discovered through the 
examination of differing cultures and the same culture across time.   
Campbell’s extensive study of various systems of mythology indicated that there 
where two very distinct types of mythology.  The first he termed bounded and the 
second universal (Campbell 1949 and 1988).   The major difference between the two has 
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to do with the nature of the way the mythological systems and the societies which create 
them and within which they are created view themselves, on both an individual and 
societal level, in relation to the rest of humanity.  Mythological systems that see the 
individual and the society of its creation as part of a larger connected cosmos or universe 
fall under what Campbell termed universal while those systems which view the 
individual and the society of its creation as superior or set apart from those individuals 
and societies other than that of its creation as bounded.     
In his studies of systems of mythologies, Campbell noted that as society evolves 
from ancient to more modern forms, there is a movement from an emphasis on universal 
mythologies to those that have an increasingly bounded nature (1949).  This is 
particularly true as science increasingly provides humanity with “answers” concerning 
the nature of life and human’s place in the larger universe.  As a belief in the 
connectedness shared by all humanity gives way to a focus on understanding and 
maintaining difference there is a shift from universal to bounded mythology.  In addition 
to this historical movement from universal to bounded mythologies in general, Campbell 
noted that there was a distinct difference between western and eastern mythology with 
western mythologies. Western mythologies on the one hand have tended to be more 
bounded while eastern mythologies have largely taken on a universal in focus.   
If one accepts that mythology is analogous to religion told in narrative form, then 
the distinction between bounded and universal mythologies made by Joseph Campbell, 
who himself was much influenced by Durkheim and Jung and the larger anti-
enlightenment movement, can be used to make sense of the difference between religion 
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and spirituality in our current postmodern social context.  The concept of religion, 
particularly in the contemporary postmodern age, is best viewed as that system of 
cultural representations associated with a society or community which is characterized 
by a bounded world view or one that excludes the portion of humanity which falls 
outside its boundaries, be them geographical,  ideological, ethnic or cultural.  
Spirituality, on the other hand is best viewed as a system of cultural representations 
associated with a society or community which is characterized by a universal world view 
that includes, or embraces the entirety of humanity without the imposition of boundaries.  
A historical survey of western religious and spiritual experience is sure to reveal 
that the work of Campbell, with its many parallels to the work of Durkheim and Jung, on 
mythology fits well the sort of framework I am offering here as an alternative approach 
for the sociology of religion.  In chapter two, I discussed the transformation of religion 
from a system that attempted to provide the individual with personal meaning and an 
understanding his/her place in the physical world where religious and spiritual 
experience was seen as integrative into what many contemporary Americans view as a 
cold organization with teachings and requirements that no longer necessarily provide the 
individual with a sense of his place in the larger context of humanity.   In our 
contemporary fragmented and bounded social milieu exposure to cultures other than our 
own has grown exponentially with the advent of the internet and other communication 
networks made possible by advances in technology.  I think Campbell’s examination of 
mythologies and religion provides evidence that because ancient communities were to a 
large extent homogenous in terms of their culture because of a lack of contact and 
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conflict with other cultures, the individual and cultural manifestation of the spirituals 
archetype tended to be universal in nature.  Technological advancements resulted in 
increased contact, conflict which leads to increasingly bounded and fragmented societies 
and thus increasingly bounded religious manifestations of the spiritual archetype.  The 
average American who has never actually physically traveled to Tibet for example can to 
one extent or another “know” its culture and religion.  This average American can chose 
to do one of two things with this new knowledge.  S/he can borrow from the Tibetan 
culture and to some extent integrate those aspects of  the culture and religion he/she is 
drawn to into his own religious worldview  and practices or can reject it and thus 
increase the boundedness of his/her sense of his/her own religion.  And perhaps there is 
a third alternative as Americans increasingly pick and chose in terms of including some 
parts of such eastern based religions while rejecting others.  And in societies where the 
population has come not only to expect but demand variety and personalization this 
mixing and matching has become increasingly more common.   
In sum, spirituality can be best viewed in terms of a grand archetype.  It is 
universal in the sense that this spiritual archetype which includes all of other elementary 
forms and elements discussed by Durkheim which drives us to experience it through 
religion.  Religion therefore can best be viewed as the cultural manifestation of the great 
spiritual archetype.  Mythology and religion provides the outlet for the fulfillment of a 
spiritual drive which is universal in the sense that it is shared by all but bounded in that 
different people and societies experience and express it in different ways.  All 
individuals are driven therefore to express this often unconscious need for spiritual 
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experience.  And while the religious venues discussed in the chapter that follows are 
unconventional and may not fit conventional definitions of religion, they none the less 
provide the individual with expressions of the major elementary forms or aspects of the 
grander spiritual archetype.  With increased societal evolution and contact between 
people of very different cultures, the representations take on increasingly narrow or 
bounded forms.  But they are none the less expressions of the same archetype that is 
found in the most traditional and ancient of societies. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
   
POSTMODERN RELIGIONS:  TOWARDS THE APPLICATION  
OF A NEW FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters I have outlined not only the major problems I see within 
the theories of religion and spirituality offered up by the academic sociology.  In the 
previous chapter, I provided what I see as a viable alternative framework which has at its 
heart the anti-enlightenment approach used by both D. E. Durkheim and C. G. Jung as 
well as in the work of Sorokin and Campbell.  It is my argument that the sort of 
approach outlined in here offers a viable alterative descriptive and explanative theory of 
religion and spirituality in the postmodern information age.  
 This chapter is an attempt to provide illustration and thus support for the extent 
to which the framework offered here provides a viable. I will begin by first examining 
the more general trend towards what might best be termed virtual religion and then turn 
to more specific “isms” that represent some of the many avenues or paths taken by 
Americans who in a very “Jungian” sense appear to be truly in search of a soul (1933).  
These “isms” include feminism, Afrocentrism, Nationalism, or what Robert Bellah 
referred to as Civil Religion (1967), and  finally the more spiritually based approached 
which can best be described as Star Warism.   
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Virtual Religion 
Advances in telecommunication technologies, the internet, and more 
conventional transportation technologies have provided the individual with an endless 
number of social groups within which one can become involved or simply experience 
anonymously.  Perhaps the best examples of this sort of hyper-religion are internet 
churches, television ministries, and religious cable networks.  Membership in, 
involvement with or simply the experience of these religious and spiritual program 
outlets differ dramatically from more traditional forms of religion in that one’s physical 
presence is not required.  The fact that the internet, telecommunications, and travel have 
allowed the postmodern individual to interact with and try on a variety of different 
religious or spiritual masks truly changes the face of religion in c contemporary society.  
They are, I believe, best viewed in terms of voluntary religious organizations.  And the 
fact that the individual has access to and can  become involved with so many different, 
and perhaps even contradictory, religious and spiritual groups increases the level to 
which the individual  is fragmented in the postmodern age. 
 Similarly, because one can participate anonymously and on his/her own terms, 
commitment to these postmodern religious and spiritual outlets are not necessary and in 
fact may be difficult if possible at all.  One can turn on and off the television or 
computer at will effectively severing all ties and commitment almost instantly.  
Similarly, one must question the quality of the religious experience for both the 
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individual and larger community involved when proximity is not an issue.  Whether or 
not they provide the real sense of individual or group religious/spiritual identity seen as 
so crucial for both Durkheim and Jung must therefore be questioned.   
The nature of the religious services, rites, and rituals have also been transformed 
within the setting of the internet and cable based networks.  Within this context 
membership status in this sort of setting to what might best be termed veiwership. This is 
an extremely postmodern phenomenon in and of itself as membership in traditional 
religious groups involved and in fact required active participation. In order to keep the 
individual involved, religious networks for example, focus not so much on increasing 
participation but insuring that the audience remains virtually fixated.  How exactly this is 
accomplished is extremely interesting.  One need only tune into such programming of an 
hour or so a day to witness the over the top production spectacle that keeps even the 
relatively uninterested and skeptical viewer fixated on the spectacle of it all.   And 
because the size of veiwership directly determines economic income, doing so takes on 
increased importance.  As such, the meaning of the rites and rituals Durkheim and Jung 
saw as so crucial for the development and maintenance of individual and group 
religious/spiritual identity have often become lost in the gilded furniture and wildly 
exotic looking hosts in order to force continued interest. 
An additional type of virtual religion/spirituality can be found in terms of a 
pursuit perhaps best termed “church shopping” or the trend of perpetually seeking a 
church or organization that meets one’s own narrowly defined needs and requirements.  
This category, and by extension the churches and organizations they become involved 
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with, if only temporarily, are increasingly narrowly focused and tend to be short lived.  
Carl Jung Dedicates an entire book to this very phenomenon.  In Modern Man in Search 
of a Soul (1934), Jung examines the tendency for contemporary individuals to search for 
religious or spiritual groups that fit their own very specific personal beliefs and an 
associated tendency to move on when a group no longer fits  exactly one’s laundry list of 
requirements.  This is particularly prevalent in American society where membership in 
small independent non-denominational churches is becoming increasing more prevalent.  
Not only can one easily change church affiliation, but if discrepancies between 
individual and organizational beliefs are discovered, members with similar ideas or 
interpretations can band together and alter the teaching of the individual church or break 
away and form new churches that meet exactly individual criteria.  The logical extension 
of this trend towards fragmentation being that eventually all churches may have 
membership roles of one.  
The postmodern landscape is certainly characterized by the fragmentation of self 
and a decrease in individual ability to commit to anything (Rosenau 1992).  Membership 
and involvement in  and experience of religious and spiritual groups and movements has 
degraded, it can be argued to transient membership in voluntary associations, or to 
extend the work of Shibutani (1961) to religious social worlds the bounds of which are 
set almost exclusively by effective (tele)communications.  The postmodern individual 
becomes involved in, if only for a short time, with a number of different religious and 
spiritual groups.  The only way for these groups to attract interest, involvement, and 
monetary support, and thus insure continued existence in a competitive market is to 
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bombard the airways, internet, or networks with information and programming, or 
simply put to market the cause.  Like the major television networks whose programming 
is not religious in nature, it would appear that such media based religious organizations 
are increasingly appear to make use of the demographic tools to increase their 
effectiveness in reaching target audiences and producing the desired effect.  Just as 
afternoon programming on most networks is geared towards children and often include 
cartoons, many of the Christian based networks now offer animated programming in the 
afternoon with Christian superheroes thus increasing the veiwership during specific time 
slots.  Similarly, daytime programming during the week often appears to be geared 
towards women and evening and nighttime programming towards family audiences.    
And in the case of religious television, the worship programming itself must be 
presented effectively and attractively so as to catch and keep viewers.  The high level of 
competition for viewers and the increasing exposure to the large number of religious 
worlds on television and the internet makes making a decision to commit difficult and 
transient as changing one’s mind has been made almost effortless. 
The sacred aspect of religion, so important to Durkheim has changed 
dramatically as well.  What was once defined as scared is often no longer considered at 
all.  Examples of this are everywhere.  A number of aspects of religion and spirituality, 
including the sacred nature of ideas and physical representations are defined and 
redefined at the individual level.  The circulating sense of truth, so common in 
postmodern society, leads also to the circulating sense of what is and is not sacred.  And 
things once clearly in the “profane” category now take on sacred religious meaning.  
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People flocking to see the image of the Virgin Mary on a tortilla in Mexico or the image 
of Christ in a screen door of a mobile home in Texas and the cults which they give rise 
to illustrate well the blurring of the lines between the sacred and profane.   
Similarly the typical church, once considered sacred by the communities who 
built and used them, have begun to disappear. The external manifestation of sacredness 
in the architecture of places of worship has given way to very nondescript, and in many 
cases, sterile buildings whose purpose is often almost indiscernible to the outsider.    The 
case of telechurches is even more profound.  Sanctuaries are nothing more than sound 
stages, often transient, that can be moved from place to place or disposed of almost 
effortlessly.   Not only is the sacredness of physical place often a transparency in this 
sort of setting but so too is the ritual from involved.  Scripted, often for specific 
audiences, the ceremonial rites, rituals, and worship take on a sense of theater and 
spectacle and increasingly lack the sacred nature once associated with religious ritual 
which both Durkheim and Jung argued were essential for the maintenance of individual 
religious identity as well as for producing social integration among members. 
And while the above discussion may appear wholly critical of virtual religion in 
general, they must be viewed in terms of the social context within which they developed 
and now exist.  The form that these religions take is indeed much evolved from the more 
traditional organizations of the past, but the function they serve remains largely the 
same.  That is, the individual, regardless of how fragmented, finds some degree of 
knowledge and understanding of his/her place in the larger social world and perhaps 
universe in which s/he exists within the context of these new virtual religions.  And 
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while the degree of involvement in and emotional attachment to these groups has 
dissipated greatly, they nonetheless have the potential to provide some level of identity 
to individual members and thus can and should be viewed as viable alternatives to the 
more traditional or mainstream religions of only a few decades ago. 
 
Nationalism: Civil Religion In America 
The first the four isms or postmodern religions/spirituality I will address takes 
the form of what Robert N. Bellah (1967) referred to as civil religion and closely mirrors 
the discussion of the worship of the state contained within the works of both Durkheim 
and Jung.  The events of September 11 2001, it can be argued were meant by the radicals 
who perpetrated the bombings was to attack America and its civil religion or sense of 
nationalism.  Instead, for a time at least, American flags flew, the level patriotism and 
pride in America increased and the war on terrorism launched by the United States 
Government was, it can be argued, an attempt to reinforce not only the United States’ 
place on the world stage, but also to renew the sense of nationalism among its members. 
To be certain, the reaction of the Unites States to 9-11 does not represent a completely 
new trend.  History tells us that in times of war, identification with country, patriotism, 
and national pride become important.  In fact Durkheim argued, and I would agree, that 
while war and national conflict are painful and often costly these events serve to provide 
an increased or heightened sense of the collective conscious and duty to one’s country 
and thus serving to make the society stronger.  And recent events certainly indicate that 
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the same is true from many Muslim societies where the Islamic state religion has been 
given a “sot in the arm” in terms of increased identification with Islam.   
And while the American Civil religion and the rituals associated with it have 
become at the very least, somewhat less important in our contemporary post-emotional 
society (Mestrovic 1997), the events of September 11, 2001 have offered the opportunity 
for a nation that has not been in a major war for nearly fifty years and has never been 
attacked on its own soil to again see the importance of civil religion.  And to be sure the 
strong sense of civil religion we are experiences, if only a temporary cultural condition, 
closely mirrors the discussions of worship of the state contained within the works of 
Durkheim and Jung.  One need only take a moment to examine American life since 
September 11, 2001, and the fact that nationalism in America is religious in nature is 
easily determined.  The beliefs, ideals, rituals, rites and customs associated with our 
American civil religion are easily identifiable. 
The pledge of allegiance, while ruled unconstitutional in California in 2002, 
serves as a sort of American prayer.  Much like an eastern mantra it is simple, easily 
learned and serves as a profession of faith in one’s country and the beliefs and ideals it 
holds.  Along the same lines, ceremonies like the memorials for the World Trade Center 
victims serve much the same function as religious gatherings in primitive religions 
where the collective effervescence is experienced by those present and in our 
postmodern information age by all those watching on those watching on TV, and thus 
leads to increased collective consciousness and national unity.    
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And while American Civil religion does not have any gods in a conventional 
sense, a look at our society through the sort of Durkheimian-Jungian lens finds gods in 
the likes of Uncle Sam, George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln.  With a little 
examination, one will find that all these people represent the ideals for which America 
Stands.  And this is squarely in line with Durkheim’s assertion that god is society or that 
god, or totems are simply a representation of the beliefs and values of the religion, and in 
this case, by extension society (Durkheim [1915] 1965).   
The totems or physical representations of American civil religion are quite 
apparent in American civil religion and often served the same functions outlined by 
Durkheim and Jung.  Totemic emblems like the flag, bald eagle, and Uncle same all 
evoke feelings of identification with America and bring to mind, in many members, the 
values and beliefs associated with the nation.  Rites and rituals similarly serve the 
function of increasing and reinforcing individual and group identity.   
A tour of Washington DC finds numerous memorials or shrines to these national 
gods or totems.  And interestingly enough, even in times where there is a general air of 
suspicion of the government or state, most citizens of our postmodern nation are still 
inclined to participate in national holidays and events and are effected (or affected) by 
such religious experiences to some degree regardless of their level of trust in the 
government and elected officials. 
But as with most other postmodern, an examination of American civil religion 
within the anti-enlightenment based framework outlined in the previous chapter several 
flaws can found associated with this (post)modern religion (Mestrovic 1997).  Both 
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Durkheim and Jung considered, and I believe correctly so, that civil religions, or those 
centered on nationality are patriarchal have a more repressive inclination and thus tends 
to operate as repressive agents of social control with almost godlike past and present 
authoritative leaders (Durkheim [1897] 1966 and Jung 1957).  For Durkheim and Jung 
alike, a more complete, universal religion/spirituality should be at least partially 
maternal in that it should function to nurture the individual and society as well.   
Furthermore, the function of civil religion is to provide integration and support 
almost solely at the societal level and provides the individual with little understanding of 
the essence of his/her own nature and relationship to the larger universe.  So while more 
traditional religions provided the individual with an explanation of our place in the 
universe, civil religions teach us of our place in one’s own society.  As such, the scope 
of this sort of religion is relatively narrow.  Civil religions, if one accepts that they are 
religious in nature, have two related functions attached to repetitive rituals and rites, first 
they serve to reinforce a sense of “we” and second, they make clear the definition of the 
“They.”   But the very ritualized holidays, including the Fourth of July, meant in theory 
to reinforce identification at the societal levels, have the potential to illicit feelings of 
disenchantment among African Americans and together minorities who have long felt 
alienated from the larger American society.   Furthermore, nationalism or American civil 
religion may be in direct conflict with the individual’s membership in other 
religious/spiritual groups. For example the fact that one self identifies as both Catholic 
and American can be complicated by the fact that beliefs in the legitimacy of capital 
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punishment, accepted by the American civil religion, may be abhorrent to one’s Catholic 
faith and thus create the possibility for internal conflict.   
The place occupied by such nationalism or civil religions occupy on the religion-
spirituality continuum proves interesting.  The very survival of any society is dependent 
upon the development of such a civil religion.  In postmodern times, where technology 
has advanced dramatically and cultural and physical boundaries are easily crossed, 
nations seem to be increasingly concerned with clearly defining, maintaining and 
protecting geographical and ideological boundaries and the what results are civil 
religions that fall more closely to bounded end of the religion spirituality continuum. As 
such, civil religions in general do not involve the ideal of compassion for all humanity as 
do more universal religious/spiritual entities as to do would be viewed at least as 
detrimental to the social order and the security of the nation itself.  Those individuals 
and groups which feel they have been excluded from such bounded civil religion may go 
outside and attempt to establish an alternative structure so as to provide a venue to 
address that which is viewed as inequality or a disparity in the larger system.  It is in this 
sort of rebellion against civil religion, I would argue, that the seeds of feminism and 
Afrocentrism can be found. 
 
Feminism 
 Feminism has for many individuals taken on a very religious or spiritual 
character in that it has come for many members of this social movement to identify or 
define who or what the individual is, the place of women in her own society and the 
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larger universe and the relationship that exists between the sexes on an individual and 
universal level.  I would like to begin my discussion of feminism by pointing out that the 
feminine aspect of the collective (un)conscious are at the very heart of both Jung and 
Durkheim’s conceptualization of religion.  In fact, it is in Jung’s own conceptualization 
of the “anima” or his label for the feminine archetypal capacity shared by both the sexes 
that he, like Durkheim, locates the source of humankind’s religi9us and spiritual 
capacities.  And in fact, the word anima itself is the Latin word for soul (Singer, 1972).  
So it should not be unexpected that feminine centered religions have a long history.  And 
Jung himself addresses at length the Marionism or the high place accorded the Virgin 
Mary in the Roman Catholic faith as what can certainly be considered an example of the 
feminist religious/spiritual perspective in some strains of anti-enlightenment though.  
Furthermore, many modern day feminists identify very closely and view very positively, 
the glorification of such “goddess” images and ideas.   
And while the contemporary feminist movement seeks for equal footing with 
men in society, in theory, the postmodern feminist version of a search for a soul” also 
represents the glorification and worship of the feminine (or female) and has a stronger 
accentuation of the characteristically or archetypal feminine attributes rather than those 
associated with “culturally” preferred masculine attributes associated with what Jung 
termed the animus.  Furthermore, the rallies and “meetings” associated with membership 
in the feminist movement are constitute, in essence, postmodern rituals that serve many 
of the same functions of the more traditional religions outlined by Durkheim and Jung.  
And to be certain, media depictions of the collective excitement experienced by 
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members at rallies certainly appear to be closely in line with is referred to as collective 
effervescence.   And thus feminism, in its purest theoretical form would appear to offer 
the possible means by which to achieve the balance between the feminine and 
masculine, or the anima and animus, which Jung and the larger anti-enlightenment 
movement in general indicates for as essential for the social and spiritual well being at 
both the individual and community and societal level. 
At the same time, I would agree with other anti-enlightenment assessments 
which argue that the reality of the current reality of the feminist movement in general 
differs in a very significant and crucial way from the ideal discussed above (Hoff- 
Sommers 1994 and Mestrovic 1992). The movement which began as an attempt to reach 
gender equality and promote inclusion of women into the economic and political 
structure, has itself become very bounded in its exclusion of an entire group of feminists 
who were now viewed as too traditional in their views.   
An entire group of women labeled conservative because of their tendency to 
deify and glorify the more traditional or archetypal image of women as feminine and 
maternal now find themselves outside of the bounds of the movement that began to set 
women free from a patriarchal society.  This faction of the larger feminist movement has 
been labeled as heretics by the more radical or liberal mainstream which appears to be 
seeking more to “masculinize” women rather than to glorify and worship the feminine 
aspects sacred by both women and men.  The dismissal of the work of Camille Paglia 
(1990 and 1992) provides an excellent illustration of the dominance of this viewpoint 
and agenda in the larger feminist movement.  That Paglia like others with more 
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traditional views in like with Jungian and Durkheimian thought have been “expelled” 
from or excommunicated from the movement by the National Organization for Women 
(NOW) for being the equivalent of modern day heretics provides evidence of the extent 
to which feminism itself has become increasingly bounded and exclusionary despite the 
inclusiveness originally at its center. And within the anti-enlightenment framework 
outlined here, such an approach is inherently flawed and differs little from the 
patriarchal models it seeks to replace in that it essentially seeks to endow women with 
the very social “powers” associated with the masculine or animus which they purport to 
despise. 
 
Afrocentrism 
Just as feminism arguably grew out of a reaction or rebellion against our American civil 
religion’s exclusion of women from full access to the American dream, the third ism 
discussed here, Afrocentrism can be seen as developing out of a similar reaction to and 
rebellion against what has been essentially, the exclusion of the majority of black 
Americans from access to the American Dream in the face of America’s stated ideology 
of equality.   The civil rights movement began as an attempt to make the stated ideology 
of equality and equal access a reality in American life.  And while the civil rights 
movement in general terms involves not only insuring equality for African Americans 
but all minority groups, the larger movement has splintered and what has evolved is a 
number of groups focused on gaining rights for more specific minority groups each 
based on a specific race, ethnicity, sexual preference, or disability. 
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The contemporary aftrocentric movement is a characteristic and perhaps 
expected outcome of the great resurgence in the importance of race and ethnicity that 
characterizes our postmodern age and came to fruition during the civil rights moment 
and the 1960’s when African Americans legally gained equal status.  Afrocentrism, as 
with the other two isms discussed above fits well into the theoretical framework 
discussed in the previous chapter.   
Afrocentrism, to a certain extent, has in a sense a (post)modern version of 
ancestor worship associated with it.  Durkheim, Jung and Campbell all indicated that this 
sort of ancestor worship was a crucial aspect common to many of very early religious 
systems associated in both eastern and western cultures and throughout the span of 
human history. And to be sure, the recently developed holiday festival Kwanzaa and the 
national observances of Martin Luther King Day and Black History Month indicate that 
a clear set of symbolic collective representations have been established thus further 
cementing Afrocentrism’s status as an alternative postmodern religion or spiritual option   
And as in the case with feminist rallies  associated with the ism in the previous section, 
the development of and participation in such rituals and customs certainly serves not 
only to strengthen individual faith in the aftrocentric movement but is also a means by 
which to intensively reinforce and solidify commitment to and membership in the larger 
movement.  And by extension, the vast number of individuals involved in these sorts of 
Afro centric movements and organizations suggest that for the African American 
population at least, this is a viable avenue for finding one’s soul. 
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But again, and from very Jungian point of view, I would argue that a soul which 
is found and thus located within such racial or ethnicity based religions or spiritualities 
too is incomplete in that it is extremely bounded as it confines identification almost 
exclusively to one’s own race and thus ignores the commonality shared by all humanity.  
It can not therefore foster a true understanding of and compassion for humanity which 
Jung, Durkheim and Campbell argue is preferable.   
The recent trend of what has been call voluntary segregation serves as 
illustration.  The early civil rights movement hoped and fought for equality and 
integration both. And to be sure, this has never been achieved completely.  The children 
of individuals who moved north to escape the continued culture of racism in the south 
and out of a hope for a better life are now moving back to the south. Atlanta, once 
viewed as a hostile relic of a segregated and prejudiced past, is now becoming a cultural 
Mecca of sorts for African Americans.  Having come back, in a very real way, many 
educated African Americans have chosen to live in exclusively black neighborhoods and 
communities thus themselves choosing voluntary segregation by living in such ethnic 
enclaves.  And while these ethnic enclaves for minorities provide positive living 
experiences, one can question whether or not such lifestyles result in detachment from 
the larger American society and its culture an in essence represent the same sort of 
exclusion the generation before fought to eliminate.  
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 Star Warsism And Beyond  
Having examined nationalism, feminism, Afrocentrism, as well as the more 
general trends involved with what are best termed virtual religions, I would like to now 
turn to an examination the trend towards increased identification with and integration of 
new age spirituality into everyday life.  Based on the recent renewed popularity of the 
Star Wars movie franchise and the spirituality which is woven into it, I will refer to this 
last ism as Star Warsism.  And to be sure the spiritual approach which is at the very heart 
of the plot of all of the Star Wars movies illustrate very well the widespread split 
between involvement in organized religions and belief in the more general “spiritual” 
principles which characterize our postmodern social and psychological landscape.  The 
proliferation of these sorts of new age approaches signifies an increased merging of 
eastern and western approaches and worldviews (Campbell 1988).   
An examination of the nature of spirituality and religion in the Star Wars movies 
provides us an opportunity to see that the capacity for a more universal or complete 
expression of spirituality, at the individual and collective experience is still possible.  
The now famous words that scrawl the screen at the beginning of the Star Wars “long 
long ago in a galaxy far far away” indicate the persistence of the spiritual and religion 
across both time and all persons. 
And other more overt universal spiritual approaches, including yoga and 
mysticism, are often dismissed by the postmodern population, the less overt, 
technologically veiled Jedi approach appeals, often at an unconscious level, to our 
contemporary collective characterized by increasingly religious and spiritual experience.  
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The alternative approach offered by new ageism in general is attractive to the 
postmodern individual searching for a soul for several reasons.  First, these sorts of new 
age spiritualities do not require membership but rather are focused more on worldviews 
and life philosophies which makes them very appealing in our current postmodern 
cultural context with its focus on individual religious and spiritual experience.  The very 
fact that many of such faiths, religions, or spiritualities do not necessarily need to 
involve worship within the confines of church serves as support for the argument that 
like the other postmodern religions/spiritualities discussed above, such new age 
endeavors, which are largely individually experienced and practiced, fit well into the 
anti-enlightenment framework I am offering as an alternative to those currently being 
offered to describe and explain religious and spiritual experience in contemporary 
America.   
Another important characteristic of such postmodern new ageism is found in the 
distinction between good and evil or sacred and profane and the acknowledgement that 
everyone contains the capacity for both.   Furthermore, while many new ageisms do not 
include a deity in the conventional sense, most include a conceptualization of some 
force, in essence what Schopenhauer meant by the will, many new age spiritualities 
involve an acknowledgement that all humanity has at least a capacity for both good and 
evil.  In the case of StarWarsism, humanity has the capacity for not only good but the 
evil associated with the dark side.  And it can be argued that these sorts of 
conceptualizations, which are largely absents in Western based religions, provide the 
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individual with a more accurate means for understanding his/her own psychological an 
social self as well the nature of the larger collective or society.   
An examination of the Star Wars movie franchise, within the alternative 
Durkheimian-Jungian framework I have outlined here, is sure to reveal the spiritual and 
religious aspects involved in the mythological journey of Luke Skywalker and the cult 
like following that has developed around this monumental postmodern cultural 
phenomenon.  In a real way, Star Wars has become a collective representation of the 
grand spiritual archetype discussed by Jung containing postmodern representations of all 
the elementary forms of religious life discussed by Durkheim presenting the postmodern 
with a new space age, science fiction mythology. Luke Skywalker represents the 
superman, savior, and messiah whose metaphorical journey leads him to an 
understanding of the force and ultimately allows him to conquer the enemy.  In many 
ways, Princess Leila represents the great mother and Madonna-whore archetype and 
helps balance this contemporary myth in that she infuses a sense of the feminine or 
anima into this science fiction version of a timeless mythological story.  The Jedi 
Knights, much like the knights of the roundtable in the King Arthur myth represent an 
embracing of the force in its totality and integration of it in a truly spiritual, universal 
fashion.  The Darth Vader character, who we later learn is the father of the superman-
savior hero, represents the potential problems associated with the potential outcome of 
the bounded utilization of the force. The moral here being that harnessing only part of 
the force, or using it in a narrowly defined, non-integrative, fashion has destructive 
effects not only at the collective level but also at the individual level.  Removing his 
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mask, Vader reveals a disfigured face.  This disfigurement represents the effects of a 
bounded approach as he no longer looks human and no longer resembles the individual 
he was as a Jedi Knight who embraced the entirety of the force.  Here, Lucas presents 
the audience with a warning suggesting that a life lived without a universal sense of 
spirituality results in psychological as well as physical disfigurement.   
What is important about Star Wars is that has been so widely embraced by a 
characteristically bounded culture with a tendency to dismiss universal approaches as 
new age rubbish.  And despite a very eastern flair it remains an alternative in a social 
milieu characterized by increasingly institutional and narrowly defined religious and 
spiritual options.   The number of people who not only identify with the force and have 
integrated it into their worldview, if in a bounded sense, continues to grow.  Recent 
censuses in Australia for example have revealed that people are now formally 
identifying with this particular variety of new age spirituality by responding Jedi when 
about religious affiliation indicating the extent to which Starwarism has become a formal 
option or choice for the expression and experience of the spiritual at the individual and 
collective level.   
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has been an attempt to provide an alternative theoretical 
framework within which to describe and analyze religious and spiritual phenomena at all 
three levels of analysis.  It is in a re-examination of the work of Durkheim coupled with 
an integration of Carl G. Jung analytical approach that I argue one can find the most 
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suitable framework for the sociological study of religion.  This dissertation has been an 
attempt to outline not only the need for such an integrative approach but also to provide 
evidence of its applicability.  All of the postmodern religious and spiritual endeavors 
discussed here serve as excellent illustration for the model I have put forward.  
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